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Free Speech and Democracy: 
A Primer for Twenty-First Century 
Reformers 
Toni M. Massaro†* & Helen Norton** 
Left unfettered, the twenty-first-century speech environment threatens to 
undermine critical pieces of the democratic project. Speech operates today 
in ways unimaginable not only to the First Amendment’s eighteenth-century 
writers but also to its twentieth-century champions. Key among these 
changes is that speech is cheaper and more abundant than ever before, and 
can be exploited — by both government and powerful private actors alike 
— as a tool for controlling others’ speech and frustrating meaningful public 
discourse and democratic outcomes.  
The Court’s longstanding First Amendment doctrine rests on a model of 
how speech works that is no longer accurate. This invites us to reconsider 
our answers to key questions and to adjust doctrine and theory to account 
for these changes. Yet there is a more or less to these re-imagining efforts: 
they may seek to topple, or instead to tweak, current theory and doctrine. 
Either route requires that reformers revisit the foundational questions 
underlying the Free Speech Clause: what, whom, and how does it protect — 
and from whom, from what, and why? 
Part I of this Article discusses the threats to public discourse and 
democracy posed in the twenty-first-century speech environment, as well as 
the failure of traditional First Amendment theory and doctrine to 
adequately address these threats. Part II compares the advantages and 
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shortcomings of topples and tweaks as strategies for reform — and by 
reform, we mean changes to theory and doctrine that may enable the First 
Amendment to better protect free speech values and democracy from the 
threats posed by cheap, abundant, and weaponized speech. Here we focus 
on tweaks and explain why. Part III identifies key features of contemporary 
theory and doctrine that hobble efforts to empower the First Amendment to 
respond to the threats to well-functioning democracy posed in the twenty-
first-century speech environment. In so doing, it introduces a process for 
considering and addressing foundational obstacles for constructive First 
Amendment reform and flags some proposals (our own, as well as others’) 
for productive tweaks to those core features. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is good news and more complicated news on the free speech 
front. First the good news: the First Amendment case law that protects 
free speech on matters of public concern is robust and, for now, 
reasonably secure.1 For this, we can thank the federal judiciary of the 
twentieth-century civil rights era, and the combination of legal and 
social forces that drove its Free Speech Clause decisions.2 In some ways 
and in certain settings,3 today’s Court never has been more convinced 
of the theoretical benefits of free speech nor more willing to protect it 
despite its potential harms.4  
 
 1 E.g., BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11 
(2015) (calling the Roberts Court the “strongest First Amendment Supreme Court in 
our history”); see also Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 372-
93 (2014) [hereinafter Tread on Me!] (outlining this steady progress while highlighting 
some significant exceptions to courts’ general speech-protective trend). 
 2 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects the advocacy of illegal action except for that “directed to inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action” and likely to incite such action); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment 
protects public primary and secondary school students’ political dissent absent a 
showing of material interference with school activities); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not permit a public official to recover damages for “a defamatory 
falsehood relating to his official conduct” absent a showing that the statement was made 
with actual malice). 
 3 For a sampling of work noting the limitations of the contemporary Court’s 
commitment to free speech, see RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE DISAPPEARING FIRST 
AMENDMENT, at xiv (2019) (observing that “the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts 
consistently have favored certainty, predictability, and consistency over speech when 
deciding First Amendment questions”); GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE 
ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST AMENDMENT, at xv (2017) (“The Roberts Court, with a 
consistency and potency unique in the Supreme Court’s history, has authorized 
established, powerful institutions strongly invested in the status quo to exercise 
managerial control over public discussion, with the apparent goal and typical result of 
pushing public discussion away from destabilizing, noisy margins and toward a stable, 
settled center.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 724 
(2011) (disputing characterizations of the contemporary Court as speech-protective); 
Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ 
Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (2009) (documenting the Court’s 
failure to protect government workers’ speech about the government’s performance 
despite that expression’s great value to the public). 
 4 See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302-03 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) (“At 
a time when free speech is under attack, it is especially important for this Court to 
remain firm on the principle that the First Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint 
discrimination.”). 
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The more complicated news is that the First Amendment faces a 
paradoxical threat: left unfettered, speech in the twenty-first century 
may undermine critical pieces of the democratic project itself.  
Freedom of speech is a precondition of a healthy constitutional 
democracy and its protection of free and fair elections, the right to vote 
and participate in the political process, due process and equal 
protection of the law, an independent judiciary, and legal institutions 
that operate with integrity and in the public interest.5 Yet in the twenty-
first-century environment, speech operates in ways unimaginable not 
only to the First Amendment’s eighteenth-century writers but also to its 
twentieth-century champions.6 As technology law scholar Tim Wu has 
explained, the new speech environment has undermined the First 
Amendment’s foundational assumptions that information is scarce and 
listeners’ attention abundant: 
The most important change in the expressive environment can 
be boiled down to one idea: it is no longer speech itself that is 
scarce, but the attention of listeners. Emerging threats to public 
discourse take advantage of this change . . . . More precisely, the 
emergent techniques of speech control depend on new 
punishments, like the unleashing of “troll armies” to abuse 
critics, the fabrication of news, and “flooding” tactics that 
distort or drown out other speech through the payment of fake 
commentators or the deployment of propaganda robots. 
Powerful actors, both public and private, have adopted speech 
itself as a weapon for controlling speech, yielding challenges for 
which the First Amendment is unprepared. . . . And the use of 
 
 5 See TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 9-
10 (2018) (describing predicates for a healthy constitutional democracy). For a 
sampling of recent work expressing anxiety about the current state of constitutional 
democracy, see id.; see, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (Mark A. Graber, 
Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018) (exploring the causes of the global 
decline of constitutional democracies); SANFORD LEVINSON & JACK M. BALKIN, 
DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION (2019) (describing differing frameworks for analyzing 
the decline of constitutional democracy); STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW 
DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018) (identifying the symptoms of democratic decline).  
 6 Robert Post described the related “paradox of public discourse” decades ago: “To 
the extent that a constitutional commitment to critical interaction prevents the law from 
articulating and sustaining a common respect for the civility rules that make possible 
the ideal of rational deliberation, public discourse corrodes the basis of its own 
existence.” ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 147 (1995); see also Toni M. Massaro & Robin Stryker, Freedom of Speech, 
Liberal Democracy, and Emerging Evidence on Civility and Effective Democratic 
Engagement, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 375 (2012) (discussing how civility norms might be 
squared with democracy and free speech values).  
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speech as a tool to suppress speech is, by its nature, challenging 
for the First Amendment to deal with — especially if it is taken 
as being in the business of protecting speech, no matter what 
the form.7 
At first blush, expression’s speed, low cost, and abundance offer clear 
First Amendment benefits. More speech means more information 
available to listeners; cheaper speech means more speakers engaged in 
public discourse and contributing to the marketplace of ideas.  
But a closer look reveals that this is not always the case. Enabled by 
twenty-first-century technology, both government and powerful private 
actors may deploy speedy, cheap, and abundant speech to control 
others’ speech, to mislead and manipulate listeners, and to undermine 
meaningful public discourse.8 As Wu observes, “[t]he fundamental 
challenge comes not from cheap speech itself, but that its cheapness 
makes it easier to weaponize as a tool of speech control. The 
unfortunate truth is that speech may be used to attack, harass, and 
silence as much as it is used to enlighten.”9  
Many of the fundamental assumptions on which free speech theory 
and doctrine have long rested are thus now unstable. That longstanding 
First Amendment doctrine rests on an inaccurate model of how speech 
actually works invites us to reconsider aspects of free speech doctrine 
that fail to adjust and account for these realities.  
To this end, Part I discusses threats to free speech and democracy 
posed in the twenty-first-century speech environment as well as how 
traditional First Amendment theory and doctrine make it difficult to 
 
 7 Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 117 MICH. L. REV. 547, 548-49 (2018).  
 8 In other words, sometimes more is less. See Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State 
in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369, 384 (2016) [hereinafter 
Regulatory State] (describing “infoglut” as a way in which sophisticated speakers can 
create confusion and undermine certainty by overloading the public with speech); see 
also David E. Pozen, Seeing Transparency More Clearly, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 326, 326 
(2019) (“[T]here is nothing incoherent about transparency policies yielding positive 
outcomes in certain settings and negative or even opposite outcomes in other 
settings.”). Sophisticated actors can and do present, even dump, information that skews 
or eliminates its value to its recipients. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY 
CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012) (exploring 
why financial service providers create, and consumers sign, one-sided contracts); OMRI 
BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF 
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014) (describing how more disclosures sometimes make 
consumers less informed). 
 9 Wu, supra note 7, at 549. Eugene Volokh was among the first to anticipate the 
paradigm-altering emergence of cheap speech in the Internet era, although he was 
largely optimistic in predicting its consequences. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and 
What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1806-07 (1995). 
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address these threats. For example, because First Amendment theory 
assumes more speech is ever better than less, it deals poorly with the 
problem of speech floods and distortions that undermine the very 
democratic, enlightenment, and autonomy ends that free speech is 
meant to advance. 
Reformers therefore must revisit the foundational questions: what, 
whom, and how does the Free Speech Clause protect — and from whom 
and from what? The remainder of this Article re-examines those basic 
questions, with an eye towards empowering the First Amendment to 
address the harms to democracy generated by the new free speech 
environment.  
Part II compares the advantages and shortcomings of topples versus 
tweaks as strategies for reform. By reform, we mean changes to theory 
and doctrine that empower the First Amendment to better protect free 
speech and democracy from the threats posed not only by the 
weaponization of speech itself, but also by the weaponization of the Free 
Speech Clause as a powerful deregulatory tool. As we will see, there is 
a more or less to doctrinal and theoretical remodeling. Reformers may 
seek to topple or instead to tweak. That is, they may seek to reconstruct 
the free speech edifice from the bottom up, or work within the edifice 
insofar as possible while urging context-specific amendments as 
dictated by speech harms.  
Although we see value in both approaches, here we emphasize tweaks 
over topples and explain why. Among other things, the nature of 
judicial decision-making is inherently incremental. Respect for 
precedent and its traditional, rhetorical framing of speech rights is hard-
baked into the judicial process. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s 
composition and character make it ill-equipped to respond well to 
rapid, technologically driven changes that threaten the traditional First 
Amendment model. And, perhaps most important, the basic First 
Amendment structures still have enduring value and serve the 
democratic ends we favor.10 Toppling those structures may unwisely 
disrupt many worthy objectives. These complexities lead us to reject a 
binary approach to theory and doctrine that either celebrates “what is” 
under American law uncritically, or condemns theory and doctrine 
unthinkingly and tosses them aside.  
 
 10 We start from the premise that the United States should remain a democracy. 
Note, however, that this premise is increasingly contested among Americans. See 
GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 5, at 30-31 (summarizing survey evidence documenting 
the growing proportion of Americans who believe that it would be “good” for the 
military to rule or to have “a strong leader who does not bother with elections”). 
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Part III revisits the key questions underlying the Free Speech Clause 
(what, whom, and how does it protect — and from whom, from what, 
and why?), identifies the primary obstacles to reform embedded in the 
First Amendment architecture, notes the fissures in the theory and 
doctrine that invite democracy-enhancing tweaks, and offers specific 
examples of these tweaks.  
For example, we note two possibilities for confronting the ever-
expanding answer to the question of why the First Amendment protects 
speech — possibilities that promote meaningful public discourse and 
democracy. The first is normative and suggests a hierarchy of free 
speech theories that privileges democratic self-governance theory as a 
tiebreaker when competing free speech theories point in different 
directions. The second relies on history and experience in setting limits 
on negative theory to identify where we have greater reason to worry 
that the government’s choices will be clumsy, partisan, or self-interested 
— and also where we have less reason to fear that the government’s 
distinctions are infected by its incompetence or malignance.  
We also emphasize doctrinal currents that privilege comparatively 
vulnerable listeners’ First Amendment interests in certain 
circumstances when they collide with speakers’ interests — as is often 
the case when speakers seek to conceal their identities from listeners 
who rely on the source of speech to gauge its credibility and quality. 
Greater attention to listeners’ interests helps explain not only when and 
why the First Amendment protects speech, but also when and why the 
First Amendment permits expression’s regulation in certain 
circumstances to preserve meaningful public discourse. 
Next, we explain how the foundational claim that the Court treats all 
governmental regulation of speech based on content or speaker identity 
with suspicion is undercut by occasional exceptions to the purported 
rule, exceptions that appropriately attend to context. In other words, 
the doctrine is not as formalistic or absolutist as it appears, which offers 
opportunities for nuanced democracy-promoting interventions. Here, 
available tweaks include exposing that the Court’s actual practice is 
often more context-sensitive than it claims, and offering solid evidence 
that documents the specific harms posed by certain expression to free 
speech and democracy — harms that can justify regulation in 
appropriate contexts. 
Mindful of the ways in which the government’s own speech can 
threaten free speech and democracy, we then confront and reject the 
simplistic claim that “government speech” lies wholly beyond 
constitutional constraint. This assertion is belied by a growing and 
commonsense appreciation of how the government’s abuse of its own 
  
1638 University of California, Davis [Vol. 54:1631 
bully pulpit can frustrate free speech and other constitutional rights. 
Here too we identify possibilities for doctrinal tweaks, building on 
pockets of precedent that recognize how the government’s threats 
sometimes silence its targets’ speech as effectively as its hard law action, 
and how its expressive attacks sometimes incite or encourage third 
parties to punish its targets for their speech.  
Finally, in light of the ways in which private (and not just 
governmental) power increasingly threatens free speech and 
democracy, we urge greater attention to when and how government 
enables the weaponization of speech by private actors, as well as to non-
constitutional approaches to encourage powerful private actors to 
incorporate democracy-promoting approaches to their own expressive 
efforts. 
In Part III we thus offer a framework for assessing when and why the 
First Amendment permits carefully designed regulations of speech to 
further free speech and democracy values. For instance, when courts, 
policymakers, and lawyers consider the constitutionality of a proposed 
intervention, we urge them to privilege the choice that maximizes 
democratic self-governance as a tiebreaker if and when competing free 
justifications point towards different choices; to privilege listeners’ 
interests over speakers’ when speakers seek to undermine democratic 
legitimacy at listeners’ expense; to consider whether and when evidence 
and precedent justify content- or speaker-based regulation calibrated to 
address threats to democracy posed by specific content or by specific 
speakers; and to consider whether and when deployment of the 
government’s own expressive powers interferes with free speech and 
democracy. 
Taken together, what would these tweaks mean on a more granular 
basis — in other words, when applied to specific proposals for 
interventions? Again, we seek to provide a framework for thinking 
about these problems more generally, but we also offer a few 
illustrations. For instance, these tweaks support an understanding of 
the First Amendment that permits the government to regulate lies about 
the mechanics of voting — like lies about who is eligible to vote, where, 
and when. We also note the government’s ability to regulate foreign 
speakers’ influence over the outcome of U.S. elections by prohibiting 
foreign entities’ campaign contributions and expenditures, and state 
efforts to combat extreme partisan gerrymandering through voter-
approved initiatives to prevent party insiders from serving on state 
redistricting commissions.  
This Article thus contributes to the ongoing discussion about the 
threats to free speech and democracy posed by the twenty-first-century 
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speech environment in at least two ways. First, it identifies the 
foundational features of contemporary First Amendment theory and 
doctrine that pose the greatest barriers to reform. Second, it emphasizes 
the gaps and ambiguities in that theory and doctrine — the edifice is 
porous in places — to show how reformers might use these gaps and 
ambiguities to push for tweaks that advance public discourse and 
democracy. 
I. HOW THE CHANGES IN TODAY’S SPEECH ENVIRONMENT THREATEN 
FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 
In this Part, we examine how and why the twenty-first-century speech 
environment is not the free speech and democracy paradise that some 
early-stage theorists hoped it would be. As we will see, speedy, cheap, 
and abundant speech does not always translate into more ideas, nor 
does it always maximize listeners’ choices. Instead it often enables non-
transparent, powerful, and sophisticated speakers to skew discourse in 
ways that undermine free speech and democratic values.11  
A. Speech Itself Is Increasingly Weaponized 
Here we sketch some of the harms to public discourse and democracy 
threatened and exacerbated by the contemporary speech environment12 
— harms that have been catalogued at length elsewhere.13  
 
 11 Although our focus in this Article is on harms to a healthy democracy, we 
recognize the potential of harm to many other values, like privacy, dignity, reputation, 
emotional well-being, physical security, and more.  
 12 See NATHANIEL PERSILY, KOFI ANNAN FOUND., THE INTERNET’S CHALLENGE TO 
DEMOCRACY: FRAMING THE PROBLEM AND ASSESSING REFORMS 5-7 (2019), 
https://pacscenter.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/a6112278-190206_ 
kaf_democracy_internet_persily_single_pages_v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA28-APJG] 
(describing the unique dangers of the twenty-first century speech environment as its 
capacity for velocity, virality, anonymity, homophily, and monopoly). 
 13 For earlier work on emerging risks of distortion in the Internet era, see, for 
example, JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD (2006) (tracing the transformation of the Internet from “a 
technology that resists territorial law to one that facilitates its enforcement”); Elizabeth 
Garrett, Political Intermediaries and the Internet “Revolution,” 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1055 
(2001) (describing two opposing schools of thought on the Internet’s impact on 
democratic functions); Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age 
of Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1653 (1998) (describing how the Internet permits users 
to “customize the universe of information they receive”); Jonathan Zittrain, Internet 
Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653 (2003) (describing how the Internet makes content 
less “regulable”). 
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First, the cheapness of speech “dramatically lower[s] costs for those 
who want to draw on people’s fears and rile them up for violent 
purposes,” which may include exacerbating political divisions, stoking 
distrust of the press and other watchdog institutions, demonizing 
opponents and critics, and fueling cynicism about democratic politics.14 
Authoritarians have long employed these expressive strategies to 
acquire and maintain power.15 
Second, the volume of speech made possible by contemporary 
technology now leaves listeners’ attention — always inherently limited16 
— increasingly scarce. Producing and ferreting out good and reliable 
speech “peaches” amidst the sea of information “lemons” — half-truths, 
distortions, lies — often takes more time and money than does 
generating and swallowing lemons.17 That the twenty-first-century 
 
Recall the caution offered by Fred Schauer, whose thoughtful approach to these 
questions is worth quoting at length:  
It would be the height of hubris to suggest that understanding and sorting out 
the various types of speech-associated harm will send the development of First 
Amendment doctrine in a new and better direction. Indeed, it would be hubris 
even to suggest that the failure to consider seriously the nature and varieties 
of speech-related harms is a major cause of an area seeming less systematic 
than even the balance of constitutional law. Still, the question of harm is one 
of huge First Amendment significance, and it has been one that has largely 
been avoided, perhaps in part because of the looming presence of a still 
pervasive but nonetheless implausible harmlessness model of speech and its 
protection. 
Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 111. 
 14 Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 
16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 216 (2017) [hereinafter Cheap Speech]. 
 15 See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 5, at 80-81; see also LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra 
note 5, at 106 (identifying authoritarians’ justification of “their consolidation of power 
by labeling their opponents as an existential threat” as a consistent contributor to 
democratic breakdown); RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction 
and the Press, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1301, 1301 (2017) [hereinafter Enemy Construction] 
(documenting the Trump Administration’s attacks on the press). 
 16 As Tim Wu notes, Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon issued an even earlier warning 
about the threats to listener attention in “an information-rich world.” Wu, supra note 
7, at 554 (quoting Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich 
World, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40-41 (Martin 
Greenberger ed., 1971)). 
 17 For a recent article offering an economic analysis of free speech costs and the 
analogy to lemons and peaches, see Daniel Hemel, Economic Perspectives on Free Speech, 
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH (Frederick Schauer & Adrienne Stone 
eds.) (forthcoming 2021) (“As the share of speech that is false rises, listeners will be 
willing to pay less for it . . . . Truthtellers, then, will be less willing to bear the high cost 
of producing truth given the low price. Bad speech will tend to drive out the good.”). 
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speech environment also contributes to the disappearance of reliable 
intermediaries only exacerbates listeners’ challenges in separating 
peaches from lemons.18 
Relatedly, today’s digital technologies are easily weaponized to 
manipulate listeners, where manipulation means “imposing a hidden or 
covert influence on another person’s decision-making” and “influencing 
someone’s beliefs, desires, emotions, habits, or behaviors without their 
conscious awareness.”19 Such manipulation undermines democracy as 
well as individual autonomy: “When citizens are targets of online 
manipulation and voter decisions rather than purchase decisions are 
swayed by hidden influence, democracy itself is called into question.”20 
Additionally, attention-strapped listeners are easily steered to 
expression that confirms their pre-existing beliefs and partisan 
affiliations, which further divides and polarizes the public in ways that 
undermine democratic ends.21 
 
 18 As Richard Hasen notes, the rise in cheap speech also undermines local 
newspapers, which have long provided a major (and sometimes the only) check on state 
and local government corruption. Hasen, Cheap Speech, supra note 14, at 209-10. 
 19 Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden 
Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 26 (2019); see also Jamie Luguri & 
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns 1 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law, 
Working Paper No. 719, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3431205 [https://perma.cc/HP2F-MKYE] (describing “dark patterns” as “user interfaces 
whose designers knowingly confuse users, make it difficult for users to express their 
actual preferences, or manipulate users into taking certain actions”). Contrast deception 
and other forms of manipulation to persuasion and even coercion, where the speaker’s 
efforts to influence the listener’s choices are transparent to the listener.  
 20 Susser et al., supra note 19, at 43; see also id. at 35 (“Since autonomy lies at the 
normative core of liberal democracies, the harm to autonomy rendered by manipulative 
practices extends beyond personal lives and relationships, reaching public institutions 
at a fundamental level.”). 
 21 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
59-68 (2018) [hereinafter #REPUBLIC] (describing how media’s filter bubbles prevent 
listeners’ serendipitous encounters with other ideas in ways that may compromise 
democracy and the pre-conditions of a system of free expression). For a nuanced 
understanding of this dynamic, see PERSILY, supra note 12, at 20 (“The social science as 
to online echo chambers has moved away from the ‘strong version’ that suggests most 
people live political homophilous online lives to a set of more complicated questions as 
to ‘who’ experiences echo chambers and ‘why.’”); Julie E. Cohen, Tailoring Election 
Regulation: The Platform is the Frame, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 641, 646-47 (2020) 
[hereinafter Tailoring Election Regulation] (describing “filter bubbles” as a “misleading” 
term, in that “[p]latform users do not experience or self-select into impermeable 
bubbles but rather sort themselves into opposing tribes” and “search for content using 
syntax that prompts algorithms to serve up tribally validating results”); id. at 652 (“The 
individual subject of the digital unconscious is not the rational listener but rather the 
listener who is not really listening at all.”). Cognitive science confirms that humans 
selectively search for, believe, and confirm that which we think we already know, in 
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These tactics are hardly new, but the digital age empowers and 
insulates them.22 Computers can tally Facebook “likes” to better predict 
some of our future choices than can our friends, parents, or spouses — 
sometimes even ourselves.23 Algorithms can steer audiences to messages 
written by ideological extremists.24 Even unintentional biases may 
distort discourse as flawed algorithms can perpetuate our cognitive 
errors in exponential ways.25 (That said, the algorithms that 
increasingly govern in our data world are not inevitably biased or 
malevolent. As Cass Sunstein recently observed, well-designed 
algorithms can correct for human cognitive biases in ways that may 
improve decisions in many realms.)26 
Deception is an especially pernicious subset of manipulation, and 
today’s speech environment enables the strategic deployment of 
falsehoods to manipulate democratic outcomes in new ways.27 As legal 
scholar Sarah Haan observes: “A defining feature of post-truthism is its 
rejection of fact-based reasoning as a means to advance the interests of 
powerful actors [who can] exploit their existing informational 
 
politics and many other areas. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 80-81 
(2011); NATALIE JOMINI STROUD, NICHE NEWS: THE POLITICS OF NEWS CHOICE 19 (2011); 
Tamara Witschge, Online Deliberation: Possibilities of the Internet for Deliberative 
Democracy, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL RENEWAL THROUGH THE 
INTERNET 109, 111, 119 (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004). 
 22 See, e.g., THOMAS RID, ACTIVE MEASURES: THE SECRET HISTORY OF DISINFORMATION 
AND POLITICAL WARFARE (2020) (discussing earlier uses of the same tactics). 
 23 See YUVAL NOAH HARARI, HOMO DEUS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF TOMORROW 344-45 
(2017). 
 24 See Kevin Roose, The Making of a YouTube Radical, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/08/technology/youtube-radical.html 
[https://perma.cc/NB94-45WK] (discussing how YouTube may have “inadvertently 
created a dangerous on-ramp to extremism by combining two things: a business model 
that rewards provocative videos with exposure and advertising dollars, and an algorithm 
that guides users down personalized paths meant to keep them glued to their screens”). 
YouTube’s efforts to block extremist videos trigger controversies of their own. See 
Neima Jahromi, The Fight for the Future of YouTube, NEW YORKER (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/the-fight-for-the-future-of-
youtube [https://perma.cc/F8FE-EV48] (discussing the complexities of YouTube’s 
efforts to moderate content). 
 25 See Cade Metz, We Teach A.I. Systems Everything, Including Our Biases, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/technology/artificial-intelligence-
bias.html [https://perma.cc/QXP6-9X3G]. 
 26 Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases, 86 SOC. RES. 499, 499-500 (2019). 
 27 See Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election Law 
in a “Post-Truth” World, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 535, 536-37 (2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3418427 [https://perma.cc/8DE6-
ESCX] [hereinafter Deep Fakes]; Helen Norton, (At Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at 
Election Lies, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 117, 122, 137 (2018) [hereinafter Thirteen Ways]. 
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advantages for political or economic gain.”28 Once false stories begin, 
they are now extraordinarily difficult to contain.29  
In recent U.S. elections, for example, a wide range of speakers not 
only spewed speech false in content, but also lied about the source of 
that speech through manufactured websites and social media posts and 
profiles falsely attributed to nonexistent individuals.30 Russian 
speakers, for instance, targeted the American electorate as part of a 
campaign to influence and manipulate the 2016 elections.31 Facebook 
ads purportedly the work of Republican teetotalers in support of 2018 
Republican senatorial candidate Roy Moore were instead secretly 
engineered by Democrats who hoped that “associating Mr. Moore with 
calls for a statewide alcohol ban would hurt him with moderate, 
business-oriented Republicans and assist the Democrat, Doug Jones, 
who won the special election by a hair-thin margin.”32 As yet another 
illustration, during the 2014 election cycle the National Republican 
Congressional Committee (“NRCC”) “created nearly 20 websites 
appearing to support Democratic candidates in all but the small print” 
that “include[d] donation forms that accept credit cards and encourage 
viewers to contribute up to $500, but instead of money going to the 
Democratic candidates, it goes to the NRCC.”33  
 
 28 Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L.J. 1351, 1356 (2019).  
 29 See PERSILY, supra note 12, at 10-11 (explaining how the Internet’s “velocity” and 
“virality” confound efforts to timely correct or combat lies). 
 30 Scott Shane, Purged Facebook Page Tied to the Kremlin Spread Anti-Immigrant Bile, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/us/politics/russia-
facebook-election.html [https://perma.cc/8ZXT-ZJZL]; Scott Shane, The Fake Americans 
Russia Created to Influence the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitter-election.html 
[https://perma.cc/GRB3-UG68]. For an in-depth analysis of how highly partisan media 
sources influenced the 2016 election, see ROBERT M. FARIS, HAL ROBERTS, BRUCE ETLING, 
NIKKI BOURASSA, ETHAN ZUCKERMAN & YOCHAI BENKLER, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR 
INTERNET & SOC’Y, PARTISANSHIP, PROPAGANDA, AND DISINFORMATION: ONLINE MEDIA AND 
THE 2016 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 130-31 (2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/ 
bitstream/handle/1/33759251/2017-08_electionReport_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4YB-
QM6C]. 
 31 Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY. 63, 70-
71 (2017) (describing Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election); Joseph Thai, The 
Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 270-74 (2018) (same).  
 32 Scott Shane & Alan Blinder, Democrats Faked Online Push to Outlaw Alcohol in 
Alabama Race, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/07/us/ 
politics/alabama-senate-facebook-roy-moore.html [https://perma.cc/YY3M-ZPNV]. 
 33 Daniel Rothberg, Republican Party Wing Creates 18 Fake Websites for Democrats, 
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Falsehoods that allege widespread voter fraud pose especially 
corrosive harms to self-governance by fueling voter cynicism and 
disengagement and inspiring disingenuous calls for legal changes that 
effectively disenfranchise certain voters.34  
Election law scholar Richard Hasen rightly asks: “Will voters on the 
losing end of a close election trust vote totals and election results 
announced by election officials when voters are bombarded with 
conspiracy theories about the reliability of voting technology and when 
foreign adversaries target voting systems to undermine confidence?”35 
Blame abounds for this weaponization of political speech. All sides of 
the political aisle too often declare that the ends of winning justify the 
expressive means, however despicable those means.36 Because both 
principled “red” conservatives and “blue” progressives (as well as those 
who defy partisan labels) legitimately deplore this state of affairs, 
 
 34 See CHRISTOPHER FAMIGHETTI, DOUGLAS KEITH & MYRNA PÉREZ, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUST., NONCITIZEN VOTING: THE MISSING MILLIONS 1 (2017), https://www. 
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_2017_NoncitizenVoting_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R827-NQ34] (finding that election officials referred only about thirty 
incidents of suspected noncitizen voting for further investigation or prosecution out of 
23.5 million votes cast in the 2016 election, and that forty out of forty-two jurisdictions 
studied reported no known incidents of noncitizen voting); Norton, Thirteen Ways, 
supra note 27, at 136 (“Most recently, President Trump claimed — without evidence — 
that ‘[i]n addition to winning the Electoral College in a landslide, I won the popular 
vote if you deduct the millions of people who voted illegally’ and ‘[s]erious voter fraud 
in Virginia, New Hampshire and California – so why isn’t the media reporting on this? 
Serious bias – big problem!’” (citations omitted)). 
 35 Hasen, Deep Fakes, supra note 27, at 536; see Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ 
Constitution: The First Amendment and Class Entrenchment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161, 
2177 (2018) (“The political production of a common good becomes impossible if 
citizens pervasively mistrust the results of the political process — for instance, if they 
doubt the objectivity of voting, they regard the system as irremediably rigged by such 
means as gerrymandering and influence peddling, or they come to regard their political 
opponents as so essentially hostile to their values and interests as to be disqualified from 
sharing in any common good. For a democratic republic to produce such an account of 
the common good, there must be no pervasive exclusion from political participation, 
and the distribution of political influence must not be so marked by inequality that the 
majority of people who must live under the law cannot regard themselves in any serious 
sense as having authorized it.”). 
 36 See Shane & Blinder, supra note 32 (“Matt Osborne, a veteran progressive activist 
who worked on the project, said he hoped that such deceptive tactics would someday 
be banned from American politics. But in the meantime, he said, he believes that 
Republicans are using such trickery and that Democrats cannot unilaterally give it up. 
‘If you don’t do it, you’re fighting with one hand tied behind your back,’ said Mr. 
Osborne, a writer and consultant who lives outside Florence, Ala. ‘You have a moral 
imperative to do this — to do whatever it takes.’”). 
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understanding how speech itself may devour free speech and democracy 
could be among the “magenta” constitutional concerns.  
But what to do about it? As the next subpart examines, not only is 
speedy, cheap, and abundant speech increasingly weaponized to 
frustrate meaningful public discourse and democratic outcomes, so too 
is the First Amendment itself increasingly weaponized to frustrate 
regulatory interventions that seek to enhance democracy or to achieve 
equality, public welfare, and other democratic goals.37  
B. The First Amendment Itself Is Increasingly Weaponized  
The traditional remedies for “the thought that we hate”38 are to speak 
against it or ignore it.39 But those remedies were never entirely 
convincing even in the very different speech environment of the early 
twentieth century.40 In today’s world, rebuttal or avoidance strategies 
seem even less effective, especially when one recalls Justice Brandeis’s 
oft-forgotten caveat in proposing counterspeech as the remedy for the 
speech that we hate: “If there be time to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, 
 
 37 See Amy Kapczynski, Free Speech, Incorporated, BOS. REV. (Dec. 5, 2019), 
http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/amy-kapczynski-free-speech-incorporated 
[https://perma.cc/2QXK-JR5Y] (“Today, most Americans are clamoring for more robust 
regulation of markets. But what companies cannot win through democratic politics, 
they are hoping to win from increasingly conservative courts, with First Amendment 
speech protections as an increasingly powerful weapon in their arsenal.”). 
 38 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 39 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“Those in the Los Angeles 
courthouse [offended by a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft”] could effectively 
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.”); 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be 
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the 
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”). 
 40 See Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 
MINN. L. REV. 11, 73 (1981) (“Brandeis’s dictum that ‘the fitting remedy for evil counsels 
is good ones’ rings hollow to an age that has seen demagogues destined to perpetrate 
unspeakable horrors use the facilities of mass communication to acquire and retain 
political power.” (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring))); Daniel 
E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160, 
1163 (2015) (“[A] considerable amount of existing empirical research . . . tends . . . to 
justify skepticism about the causal efficacy of establishing an open marketplace of ideas 
in identifying true propositions and rejecting false ones.”); Frederick Schauer, Facts and 
the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 910-11 (2010) (“[T]he persistence of the 
belief that a good remedy for false speech is more speech, or that truth will prevail in 
the long run, may itself be an example of the resistance of false factual propositions to 
argument and counterexample.”).  
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the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”41 Time 
for counterspeech is now vanishingly small, as information technology 
permits speakers to reach global audiences instantly. And efforts to 
refute lies can instead affirmatively reinforce them in listeners’ 
memories.42 Indeed, as Daniel Kahneman documents, “[a] reliable way 
to make people believe in falsehoods is frequent repetition, because 
familiarity is not easily distinguished from truth.”43 Finally, when many 
speak at once, few may be heard. Meaningful counterspeech thus may 
not be a realistic option for those without the resources or expertise to 
confront well-aimed lies with rebuttals of equal volume, speed, and 
listener-targeted precision.  
Yet even as rebuttal and avoidance are increasingly ineffective shields 
from weaponized speech, governmental remedies remain profoundly 
worrisome. This is especially true in this hyper-partisan moment when 
concern has spiked about the government’s viewpoint-specific 
censorship of political opponents and platforms, and about its abuse of 
its own powerful voice.  
These dueling risks create a familiar tension that is exacerbated by 
new developments, both technological and sociopolitical.44 On the one 
 
 41 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 42 See Ian Skurnik, Carolyn Yoon, Denise C. Park & Norbert Schwarz, How 
Warnings About False Claims Become Recommendations, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 713, 713-
14 (2005). 
 43 KAHNEMAN, supra note 21, at 62. 
 44 Many others have wrestled more generally with a multitude of free speech issues 
triggered by technological advances. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS 
OF CYBERSPACE (1999) (envisioning “the expanding architecture of regulation that the 
Internet will become”); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO 
STOP IT (2008) (arguing that burgeoning fear of information theft will necessitate more 
rigid regulation of digital participation); Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, 
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 1435 (2011) (advocating for “internet intermediaries” to combat online 
hate speech); James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42 
(2015) (presenting content moderators as a bridge between too much freedom and too 
much control for online users); Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First 
Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 11 (2006) (outlining the dangers of using private companies as “proxy censors” in 
lieu of government regulation of the Internet); Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, 
and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the “Speaker” Within the New Media, 71 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 79, 118 (1995) (advocating for different rules of speech liability for Internet 
service providers and users); Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519 (2019) (examining self-regulation of social media platforms 
in absence of government regulation); Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary 
Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 
67 DUKE L.J. 981 (2018) (describing Google Spain as a case study of dignitary privacy in 
light of European regulations). 
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hand, speech obviously can, and does, promote democratic values, 
autonomy, human creativity, enlightenment, and character 
development. The judiciary thus must protect expression from 
government censorship. On the other hand, speech can, and does, 
distort and corrupt elections; mislead and defraud voters, consumers, 
and clients; inspire people to harm others; advance criminal ends; and 
more. The judiciary thus must preserve room for government regulation 
of speech as necessary to prevent grave harms, especially harms to 
democracy, while mindful of that power’s potential misuse.45  
But this tension too often leads the contemporary Court to throw up 
its hands and choose the purported clarity of articulating bright-line 
rules over the complexities of identifying context-sensitive standards.46 
This, in turn, increasingly inspires those who seek to protect their 
economic interests, as well as those ideologically committed to 
economic libertarianism, to challenge regulation on First Amendment 
grounds and seek full-dress strict scrutiny to protect these interests.47 
Indeed the mission creep of the First Amendment — its ever-expanding 
coverage — is a critical component of weaponization. When all a 
deregulation advocate has is a free speech “hammer,” everything may 
look like a free speech “nail.” And in the modern information-driven 
economy, arguments that what is being regulated is “expression” rather 
 
 45 Speech can also collide with other constitutional rights in ways that are difficult 
to juggle. For a thoughtful examination of this problem, see TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC 
FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 
at xi (2018). 
 46 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 3, at xiii (“[M]any of the categorical rules that the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have adopted in cases where a would-be speaker needs 
the government’s assistance in order to speak actually protect less speech than the open-
ended balancing tests that they replaced.”).  
 47 See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First 
Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1976 (2018) (describing this emerging and well-
funded coalition as a kind of “First Amendment-industrial complex” (emphasis 
omitted)). Note that we do not suggest that deregulatory moves reliant on fortified 
constitutional tools are unique to the First Amendment zone. Carol Rose, for example, 
has noted parallel developments in property law, where the Takings Clause became a 
formidable deregulatory weapon. See Carol M. Rose, The Story of Lucas: Environmental 
Land Use Regulation Between Developers and the Deep Blue Sea, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
STORIES 237, 239-41 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005) (discussing the 
history of regulatory takings as applied to environmental regulation and land use law). 
Indeed, land use law offers a rich example of a field in which various deregulatory moves 
based on constitutional law principles (like freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and 
freedom from uncompensated takings) have combined to transform these local 
decisions — once the province of state and local actors and relatively insulated from 
constitutional review — into a constitutional law hot zone. 
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than “conduct” are often quite persuasive.48 Speech is everywhere, once 
one looks for it.  
As Julie Cohen has explained, our economy’s emphasis has shifted to 
the “development of intellectual and informational goods and services, 
production and distribution of consumer information technologies, and 
ownership of service-delivery enterprises.”49 In this new information 
economy, economic regulation increasingly invites characterization 
(and attack) not as the regulation of commercial conduct, but instead 
as the regulation of information and thus speech.50 Under today’s free 
speech doctrine, the government’s content- or speaker-based regulation 
presumptively triggers strict scrutiny, at least in public discourse and 
sometimes elsewhere.51 Yet one can hardly imagine the government’s 
regulation of specific industries or professions that would not be 
content- or speaker-specific. Looks here thus “can kill” the 
 
 48 See Kessler & Pozen, supra note 47, at 1973-75 (observing that neoliberalism 
calls for the regulation of information more than conduct, which “makes economic 
regulation more susceptible to First Amendment scrutiny”); Helen Norton, 
Discrimination, the Speech That Enables It, and the First Amendment, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 209, 223-24 [hereinafter Discrimination] (detailing commercial actors’ increasing 
claims that certain antidiscrimination laws that regulate commercial transactions 
regulate speech rather than conduct). For a recent illustration of this trend to expand 
speech coverage outward, see Justin S. Wales & Richard J. Ovelmen, Bitcoin Is Speech: 
Notes Toward Developing the Conceptual Contours of Its Protection Under the First 
Amendment, 74 U. MIAMI L. REV. 204, 253-54 (2019). 
 49 See Cohen, Regulatory State, supra note 8, at 371. 
 50 See sources cited supra note 48. 
 51 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (“Content-based laws — those 
that target speech based on its communicative content — are presumptively 
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are 
narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (striking down a California law that regulated the sale 
of violent interactive videos to minors without parental consent); Sorrell v. IMS Health, 
Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564-65 (2011) (striking down a Vermont statute that regulated the 
sale of information regarding doctors’ prescribing practices for use in pharmaceutical 
marketing on grounds that statute burdened “disfavored speech by disfavored 
speakers”); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-70 (2010) (striking down on 
overbreadth grounds a federal law that criminalized the commercial creation, sale, or 
possession of depictions of animal cruelty — and rejecting as “startling and dangerous” 
what it characterized as the Government’s proposed “free-floating test for First 
Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and 
benefits”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Speech 
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to 
control content.”). For a critique of unnuanced invocations of Reed’s application to 
compelled speech, see Note, Two Models of the Right to Not Speak, 133 HARV. L. REV. 
2359, 2367-68 (2020); see also Massaro, Tread on Me!, supra note 1, at 407-11 (offering 
taxonomy of compelled speech cases and distinguishing among them in ways that hinge 
on speaker roles, listener interests, and government purposes in compelling speech). 
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government’s efforts to address the harms of certain expression, to use 
Kenji Yoshino’s quip about the consequences of vigorous strict 
scrutiny.52 In fact, they usually do.53 
Progressive Justices have noted and condemned the majority’s 
“weaponization” of the First Amendment for antiregulatory ends.54 
Many academic commentators share this worry.55 Jeremy Kessler and 
David Pozen, for instance, have synthesized, in a fresh and fair way, a 
wide swath of scholarship that addresses the equality costs of free 
speech and suggests practical strategies for protecting economic and 
social welfare legislation designed to achieve egalitarian goals.56 
Framing the issue as whether “progressive civil libertarianism can be 
reimagined for the digital age in ways that make good on its egalitarian 
promise while limiting possibilities for government censorship and 
abuse,” they identify familiar options for this re-imagination: voice 
 
 52 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756 (2011). 
 53 Fewer than a handful of speech restrictions have survived the Court’s strict 
scrutiny in recent years. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015) 
(upholding some limits on judicial candidates’ campaign speech); Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (upholding a statutory ban on speech 
coordinated with foreign organizations identified as terrorist by United States 
government); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding 
limits on the distribution of campaign literature within 100 feet of polling places); see 
also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 844-55 (2006) (presenting an 
empirical study of lower courts’ application of strict scrutiny and concluding that the 
government was least likely to survive — at a rate of twenty-two percent — strict 
scrutiny in the Free Speech Clause context). 
 54 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the majority as “weaponizing the First 
Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in 
economic and regulatory policy”); see Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 591-92, 602-03 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (describing the Court’s use of free speech to strike down legislation as 
reminiscent of its Lochner-era deployment of the Due Process Clause to strike down 
economic legislation). 
 55 E.g., TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL 
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 28-30 (2012); Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First 
Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 323-26 (2016); Leslie Kendrick, 
First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1207, 1209 (2015); 
Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 
2117, 2120 (2018) [hereinafter Imagining]; Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the 
Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31, 34-35 
(2016) [hereinafter Truth and Lies in the Workplace]; Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 
2016 WISC. L. REV. 133, 134.  
 56 Kessler & Pozen, supra note 47, at 1999-2000. 
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versus exit, reform versus revolution.57 Put another way, change-
minded thinkers can try to topple or tweak.  
We agree. Inequality is a serious threat both to individual human 
flourishing and to democracy, and a First Amendment doctrine 
unmindful of inegalitarian conditions may exacerbate them.58 Indeed, 
the weaponization of free speech doctrine may obscure or distort 
choices about all normative ends, including but not limited to equality. 
The question of how to protect important governmental efforts to 
address economic and other material inequalities from First 
Amendment attack is thus related to, but not quite the same as, the 
question that we address here: how to stop speech from undermining 
the functioning of a healthy democracy.59  
 
 57 Id. at 2009-10; see also id. at 1953-54 (describing a “grammar of free speech 
egalitarianism” for addressing these challenges and concluding that “[i]f First 
Amendment Lochnerism is to be countered in any concerted fashion, the roadmap for 
reform will be found within this grammar; where it gives out, a new language may 
become necessary”). 
 58 See Massaro, Tread on Me!, supra note 1, at 371; Helen Norton, Powerful Speakers 
and Their Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 441, 450-68 (2019) [hereinafter Powerful 
Speakers] (discussing how free speech doctrine should, and sometimes does, attend to 
inequalities of information and power). No liberal democracy worthy of our faith can 
ignore how hard-wired inequality is in the United States, nor how much remains 
undone to make neutrality principles truly liberal or democratic. Baselines matter. 
 59 For thoughtful attention to both sets of questions, see Nelson Tebbe, A 
Democratic Political Economy for the First Amendment, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 961-62 
(2020) (proposing “a democratic interpretation of the First Amendment that 
harmonizes rights protection with concern for political, social, and economic 
belonging” by recognizing that “people who are suffering from certain forms of 
deprivation and disadvantage will find it impossible to exercise their basic rights to 
participate in the project of cooperative government”). We note — though do not 
plumb — the many intellectual predecessors who long ago recognized and anticipated 
related challenges. See, e.g., WALTER F. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (1957) (questioning the common premise that a legal conception of 
freedom is the only basis for First Amendment critique); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 146, 163, 215 (1987) (critiquing 
the First Amendment as an absolutist barrier to the regulation of subordinating speech); 
MARI J. MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLÈ WILLIAMS 
CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT (1993) (advocating for public regulation of assaultive speech at the 
intersection of constitutional law and critical race theory); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? (2016) (arguing that “free speech idolatry” has 
overtaken attention to speech’s impact on a host of pressing social concerns); JEREMY 
WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012) (arguing that hate speech undermines the 
public good); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 
1407-08 (1986) (arguing that capitalism is foundational to understanding the 
“tradition” of the First Amendment).  
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Although none of this is new, the challenges to constitutional 
democracy now seem especially grave, as speech is more evidently and 
disturbingly both the solution and the problem. What can, or should, 
First Amendment law do about these challenges? We turn again to Tim 
Wu, who identifies two possibilities:  
The first is to admit defeat and suggest that the role of the 
political First Amendment will be confined to harms that fall 
within the original 1920s paradigm. There remains important 
work to be done here, as protecting the press and other speakers 
from explicit government censorship will continue to be 
essential. And perhaps this is all that might be expected from 
the Constitution (and the judiciary). The second — and more 
ambitious — answer is to imagine how First Amendment 
doctrine might adapt to the kinds of speech manipulation 
described above.60  
In the remainder of this Article, we take up the task implied in the 
second of these possibilities, and “imagine how First Amendment 
doctrine might adapt” to the democratic challenges posed by the 
twenty-first-century speech environment.  
II. STRATEGIES FOR REFORM: TOPPLES AND TWEAKS 
By topples, we mean abandoning or replacing certain Free Speech 
Clause theories and doctrines altogether.61 Tweaks, in contrast, do not 
require overruling past precedent but instead emphasize one theoretical 
or doctrinal strand among available (if sometimes inconsistent) strands 
— the sort of choice about what to analogize and what to distinguish 
that is endemic to much legal reasoning. Tweaks thus differ from 
topples in their scope and speed of change. Note too that the decision 
to describe a proposal as a tweak or a topple is itself a contestable 
framing choice.62 Depending on your baseline, urging a return to a 
longstanding but more recently abandoned doctrine may be 
 
 60 Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, in EMERGING THREATS 2, 17 (2017). 
 61 Topples include, for example, altogether abandoning certain theories (like 
autonomy theory) or certain doctrines (like the state action doctrine). 
 62 See Lakier, Imagining, supra note 55, at 2158 (“The transformation of the First 
Amendment that this Essay calls for may simply not be politically feasible right now. 
And yet there is value in remembering both what the First Amendment has been and 
what it may be again. Doing so reminds us that the free speech guarantee is susceptible 
to multiple interpretations and that the disequalizing tendencies of contemporary free 
speech law are neither necessary nor inevitable.”). 
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characterized as a tweak, or instead as a topple.63 That said, the 
distinction between these types of reforms is meaningful even if blurred 
at the edges. 
Much of today’s First Amendment challenge is structural. Basic 
assumptions — many of which are now undermined by the twenty-first-
century speech environment — create the theoretical and doctrinal 
obstacles to addressing contemporary threats to free speech and 
democracy.64 Rethinking fundamental assumptions inevitably invites 
fundamental rethinking of theory and doctrine — which, in turn, 
suggests the need for topples rather than tweaks.65  
Yet here we focus on tweaks, largely because the Court’s traditional 
approaches to free speech problems are so resilient. Several factors 
contribute to this resilience. 
First, the judicial process is inherently incremental and retrospective. 
Courts rarely topple basic principles and tend to take existing doctrine 
seriously, given stare decisis and its role in assuring judicial integrity 
and doctrinal stability.  
Second, judges, lawyers, and scholars alike are understandably wary 
of encouraging the Court to act boldly when revisiting First 
Amendment precedent, lest it swing too widely and jettison worthy law 
in favor of less constitutionally and normatively desirable options.  
 
 63 See id. at 2159 (“This Essay argues that scholars need not reinvent the wheel to 
construct a First Amendment doctrine that does a better job of ensuring that free speech 
rights are — in practice and not just in theory — ‘available to all, not merely to those 
who can pay their own way.’ Instead, they can — and perhaps should — look to the 
First Amendment’s past as a guidepost for its future.”). For the strategic reasons 
discussed in this Part, there is value in emphasizing a proposal’s tweak-ish components. 
 64 See Kessler & Pozen, supra note 47, at 1999 (2018) (“[T]he failure of such 
arguments reflects both the substantively libertarian orientation of First Amendment 
doctrine and the arguments’ awkward fit with the structure of public law litigation — a 
structure that disinclines judges to acknowledge and balance the competing 
constitutional interests of private parties.”); Louis Michael Seidman, Can Free Speech Be 
Progressive?, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2219, 2226 (2018) (“The theory, structure, and 
tradition of American free speech law make it a particularly unpromising entry point 
for a progressive transformation.”). 
 65 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 77 (3d ed. 1996) 
(“The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept 
another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both 
paradigms with nature and with each other.” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 91 (“The 
proliferation of competing articulations, the willingness to try anything, the expression 
of explicit discontent, the resource to philosophy and to debate over fundamentals, all 
these are symptoms of a transition from normal to extraordinary research. It is upon 
their existence more than upon that of revolutions that the notion of normal science 
depends.”).  
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Third, proposals to cabin expression’s harms trigger painful 
recollections of the government’s many efforts to suppress political 
speech, especially dissent and criticism aimed at the government itself.66 
Only freedom’s enemies, these iconic stories warn, oppose expansive 
speech coverage. Men always have feared “witches,” and government 
always has “burnt women.”67 Regulators who try to check speech in the 
interest of other, worthy government goals thus may be labeled as 
speech traitors — intellectually dishonest censors and book burners, 
unpatriotic and illiberal purveyors of political correctness, or worse.  
The resilience of the Court’s traditional approaches has still other and 
overlapping roots. These approaches often appeal to our positive sense 
of self and agency: they presume us to be rational and self-governing 
such that government interventions smack of demeaning paternalism. 
“Don’t tread on me!” rings not only traditional, but also modern, liberty 
bells. Arguments that foreground human vulnerabilities (we are not 
always rational and self-regarding) are jarring to those who prize 
autonomy and fear government paternalism. 
The dominant speech narratives also thwart reform efforts because 
they are well worn and familiar. Think of the pithy and powerful 
aphorisms of earlier eras like “Men feared witches and burnt women” 
— a line that still resonates a century after Brandeis first penned it.68 To 
overcome the allure of such memorable passages requires new, equally 
beguiling stories and rhetoric to counter the old tales and metaphors, if 
only to force greater attention to the democratic harms threatened in 
today’s speech environment. And courts (like the rest of us) often prefer 
simple stories to the complex. Thus, they prefer uniform free speech 
rules that can apply to all expression regardless of context. Recall, most 
 
 66 E.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (rejecting 
the government’s request for an injunction to stop The New York Times and other 
newspapers from publishing the Pentagon Papers); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 
212 (1919) (upholding the government’s criminal prosecution and conviction of labor 
leader and presidential candidate Eugene Debs for criticizing the war effort). 
 67 See MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION 105-57 (2019) (critiquing 
unexamined deference to speech rights without attention to its harms to vulnerable 
persons and groups); Mary Anne Franks & Ari Ezra Waldman, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: 
Deep Fakes and Free Speech Delusions, 78 MD. L. REV. 892, 897 (2019) (“Arguing that 
we should not enact reasonable limitations on harmful speech because historical speech 
restrictions often targeted minority voices is like saying we should not criminalize rape 
because the criminal law has long been used to subjugate women.”).  
 68 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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prominently, the presumption that all speaker- or content-specific 
regulations trigger strict scrutiny.69 
On top of the foregoing obstacles to substantial theoretical or 
doctrinal change is the matter of judicial expertise. The current Court 
is simply ill-equipped to manage the rapidly evolving technological 
aspects of the new speech environment or to impose sensible limits 
narrowly tailored to its dangers. Some Justices resist, even ridicule, what 
they call social science “gobbledygook,”70 and often view “novelty” in 
constitutional law as presumptively dangerous.71 The Court’s aversion 
to innovation, together with its penchant for the past, are grim news for 
many areas of law. But it is especially bad news for the First Amendment 
as new information technologies usher in exponential changes.  
For all of these reasons, arguments that challenge the traditional 
assumptions underlying First Amendment law are like salmon, 
swimming upstream against a rapid current of judicial, rhetorical, 
doctrinal, and institutional resistance.72 Because we cannot wish away 
the strength of this judicial resistance, topples aimed at Supreme Court 
doctrine remain unlikely in the short term, even as we recognize 
topples’ powerful pull at a time when the threats to our democracy feel 
increasingly existential. 
 
 69 E.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (stating that content-
based laws are presumptively unconstitutional). 
 70 Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 
16-1161), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/16-
1161_kjfm.pdf [https://perma.cc/SV89-4HEB] (statement of Roberts, C.J.) (“[T]he 
whole point is you’re taking these issues away from democracy and you’re throwing 
them into the courts pursuant to, and it may be simply my educational background, but 
I can only describe as sociological gobbledygook.”). 
 71 Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407, 1407 (2017) 
(describing and critiquing the tendency of the current Justices to treat a statute’s novelty 
as evidence of its unconstitutionality). 
 72 To be sure, some Justices and many scholars agree that in order to affect the right 
balance between these risks, courts and policymakers must frankly acknowledge the 
threats as well as the benefits of cheap, abundant, and manipulable speech to free speech 
and democracy. See, e.g., Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2304 (2019) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I believe we would do better to treat this 
Court’s speech-related categories not as outcome-determinative rules, but instead as 
rules of thumb.”); Rebecca L. Brown, The Harm Principle and Free Speech, 89 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 953, 960 (2016) (arguing against a “constitutional default rule that categorically 
disables government from legislating for the common good” and urging the Court to 
engage in more nuanced decision-making); Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 
B.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2016) (proposing “a theory for balancing free speech against other 
express and implied constitutional, statutory, and doctrinal values”). These thinkers 
recognize the difficulty in capturing the “just so” balance between protecting speech 
and mitigating its harms but do not regard the task as hopeless.  
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We therefore emphasize tweaks. As we explain in Part III, nothing 
about current theory or doctrine points inexorably in one direction.73 
Courts can (and sometimes do) sidestep, even pivot, for better and for 
worse.74 Indeed, doctrinal exceptions abound already, from which new 
possibilities may emerge. As doctrinal exceptions accumulate, courts 
may develop new context-sensitive rules to accommodate particularly 
powerful evidence that the old rules fit poorly in some places. Moreover, 
the brisk pace and power of technological change may hasten the day 
of structural doctrinal and theoretical reckoning.75 Modern reformers 
should emphasize these intra-doctrinal tensions, reminding the Court 
that the effort to strike the appropriate balance between protecting 
speech and mitigating its harms is an ongoing struggle, waged internal 
to doctrine, and one that has always vexed policymakers, scholars.  
In short, First Amendment traditionalism, however stubborn, need 
not ever and always be the enemy of a more practical First Amendment 
good.76 But the successful interventions, for now, are likely to be those 
that observe common law customs by drawing from prior cases, 
proceeding incrementally, justifying departures, and redefining law and 
theory as new patterns emerge.  
III. TARGETS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE TWEAKS 
Here we name several struts of contemporary theory and doctrine that 
hobble efforts to empower the First Amendment to respond to the 
 
 73 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Constitutional Law’s Conflicting Premises, 96 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 447, 451 (2020) (describing these sorts of “doctrinal inconsistenc[ies] as 
Constitutional Law’s special feature and bug. Virtually every salient domain presents 
major precedents operating in tension. Bodies of precedent are rarely abandoned simply 
because a newer strand makes an older one appear out of place. And when the earlier 
strand is redeployed, the once-newer strand likewise persists”). 
 74 E.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2463-65 (2018) (overruling forty years of precedent to hold that requiring 
nonmembers of public sector unions to pay agency fees violates the First Amendment). 
 75 For an explanation of how tweaks become topples in the scientific world, see 
KUHN, supra note 65, at 6 (“[When] the profession can no longer evade anomalies that 
subvert the existing tradition of scientific practice — then begin the extraordinary 
investigations that lead the profession at last to a new set of commitments . . . .”); id. at 
52-53 (“Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition 
that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern 
normal science. It then continues with a more or less extended exploration of the area 
of anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the 
anomalous has become the expected.”).  
 76 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 3, at xvii (“[T]he Warren Court was more willing to 
innovate, to create, to bend First Amendment rules and theory to support the process of 
democratic self-government, than its successors have proven to be.”).  
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threats posed to free speech and democracy in the twenty-first-century 
speech environment, and flag some proposals (our own, as well as 
others’) for productive revisions of those struts. Rather than catalogue 
all the possible specific interventions, we introduce a process for 
considering and addressing obstacles for constructive change, a process 
that requires us to revisit foundational First Amendment questions and 
their answers.77  
A. Confronting the Ever-Expanding Justifications for Free Speech 
Protection 
Why does the First Amendment protect speech from the government’s 
unjustified interference? There is no single, unifying answer — and 
understandably so.78 Because multiple theories dominate the case law 
and commentary, the resulting doctrine remains theoretically 
pluralistic, incredibly ornate, and at times internally incoherent.79 And 
because these traditional theories focus on the good in speech rather 
 
 77 Rather than offer a compendium, we seek to organize ongoing engagement with 
these issues in digestible form to mobilize further conversation. That is, we take 
seriously Tim Wu’s cautionary note about limited listener attention in an information-
rich world. Like all areas of public discourse, legal scholarship has expanded via the 
new media. Making sense of the flood of ideas — springing from traditional and non-
traditional journals, books (print and audio), webcasts, podcasts, blogs, op-eds, tweets 
— is time-consuming and hard work. The role of the engaged listener within the 
academic marketplace of ideas — no less than the role of the engaged listener more 
generally — has never been more challenging, nor more necessary. The job of academic 
speakers also has become harder. Translating the burgeoning sea of relevant 
information into digestible, manageable forms becomes more essential. Getting 
audience attention — even academic audience attention — without resorting to 
intentionally provocative and hyperbolic theses, sound bite rhetoric, or complexity-
crushing compression is increasingly difficult. Detail and nuance sometimes fall by the 
wayside in light of the growing need for synthesis that helps audiences navigate 
sophisticated ideas and a rapidly changing information environment. And yes, we see 
the irony. 
 78 See HARRY KALVEN, JR., Preface to A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN 
AMERICA (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) (“The Court has not fashioned a single, general 
theory which would explain all of its decisions; rather, it has floated different principles 
for different problems.”); L.A. Powe, Jr., Scholarship and Markets, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
172, 179 (1987) (“[W]hen combined, the various theories of freedom of expression are 
far stronger than the sum of the parts.”); Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and 
Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1212, 1216, 1282-83 (1983) (arguing against a single general theory of the First 
Amendment). 
 79 See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 267, 278 (1991) (describing the doctrine as “a vast Sargasso Sea of drifting 
and entangled values, theories, rules, exceptions, [and] predilections . . . requir[ing] 
determined interpretive effort to derive a useful set of constitutional principles”). 
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than its harmful consequences, they offer little in the way of answers to 
thorny application questions.80 
The most influential free speech theories fall into two clusters: 
positive arguments that identify expression’s affirmative value (like 
democratic self-governance,81 enlightenment through a robust 
marketplace of ideas,82 and individual autonomy83) and negative 
arguments that focus instead on the dangers of the government’s 
regulation of expression.84 Together, these sets of theories are so 
capacious as to permit the coverage, and perhaps the protection, of 
virtually all speech (and increasingly much conduct as well85), with 
little room for limiting principles that explain when the First 
Amendment permits the government to regulate speech that inflicts 
democratic and other harms. 
For example, democracy-based theories emphasize the value of 
speech to democratic self-governance (rather than to individual 
speakers). Alexander Meiklejohn, often cited for developing this 
approach, famously noted that what matters for freedom of speech is 
 
 80 See Massaro, Tread on Me!, supra note 1, at 389 (noting that the prevailing 
“theories are great at explaining why speech is valuable in a liberal democracy that 
prizes individual autonomy, even if the content seems worthless to others; but even the 
best of them offer too little by themselves to inform or justify much past, present, or 
future judicial line-drawing that excludes some speech from the constitutional fold” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 81 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1st ed. 1948) (proposing that the freedom of speech guarantees positive 
rights to U.S. citizens that inform their opinions on matters essential to self-
governance). 
 82 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes 
safely can be carried out.”). 
 83 E.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 5 (1989) 
(emphasizing individualistic concerns and speaker liberty); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 201-05 (1977) (focusing on speaker dignity and respect); Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 
283, 283 (2011) (proposing a theory of the First Amendment that emphasizes thinkers’ 
autonomy). 
 84 See Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially 
Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008) (discussing the negative view of 
the First Amendment that “does not rest on the affirmative claim that free speech will 
lead to any particular social or political benefits” and instead emphasizes the dangers 
created “when collective entities are involved in the determination of truth”). 
 85 See Norton, Discrimination, supra note 48, at 223-34 (describing some 
commercial actors’ reliance on First Amendment claims to challenge the regulation of 
commercial conduct).  
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not that all speak, but that “everything worth saying shall be said.”86 
Under this theory, the First Amendment may be interpreted to cover an 
expansive range of speech: what isn’t “worth saying,” even if only for 
the sake of informed voting and democratic participation?  
Relying largely on expression’s instrumental value to listeners, the 
marketplace of ideas (or enlightenment) theory also resists limiting 
principles.87 Emphasizing the production of ideas and information 
regardless of their source, and assuming that more speech is always 
better in facilitating listeners’ acquisition of knowledge and discovery of 
truth, this theory finds constitutional value in all information, apart 
from any connection to democratic participation or culture.88  
And, of course, the same is true of autonomy-based theories: all 
speech furthers the speaker’s autonomy to say what she will.89 
So, under positive rights theories, virtually all expression arguably 
promotes the democracy-based, enlightenment, or autonomy benefits 
of free speech.90 Indeed, the elasticity of these speech justifications 
makes it difficult to place any speakers or any topic wholly outside their 
embrace. The more zones of government involvement, the more topics 
become relevant to self-governance. The more ideas thrust into the 
public sphere, the larger the marketplace of ideas. The more ecumenical 
 
 86 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE 26 (1st ed. 1948). 
 87 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-34 (1982); 
Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 41-42. 
 88 See Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. 
L. REV. 422, 423 (1980) (describing the values most often located at the heart of the 
First Amendment as including the search for truth and the discovery and dissemination 
of knowledge). 
 89 See Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial 
Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1175-78 (2016) (discussing the broad reach of 
First Amendment autonomy theory). As discussed in more detail infra Part III.B, 
however, sometimes speakers’ and listeners’ autonomy interests collide. 
 90 Related positive free speech theories emphasize expression’s ability to develop 
our capacities for tolerance and other positive character traits. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, 
THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 157-58 
(1986) (“For speech that attacks and challenges community values, the act of toleration 
serves to both define and reaffirm those values; the act of tolerance implies a contrary 
belief and demonstrates a confidence and security in the correctness of the community 
norm.”); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1567, 1569 
(1998) (“[A] culture that prizes and protects expressive liberty nurtures in its members 
certain character traits such as inquisitiveness, independence of judgment, distrust of 
authority, willingness to take initiative, perseverance, and the courage to confront evil. 
Such character traits are valuable, so the argument goes, not for their intrinsic virtue 
but for their instrumental contribution to collective well-being, social as well as 
political.”). 
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one’s notion of individual autonomy, the more generous one becomes 
about allowing the individual to express herself — even in vulgar, 
hateful, threatening, disruptive, or horrific ways. In short, all of the 
positive theories are elastic and in one direction only, pushing ever 
outward with little in the way of clear borders.91  
At the same time, negative First Amendment theory urges that we 
protect speech from the government’s regulation not because speech is 
so valuable in itself, but instead because the government is so 
dangerous. To illustrate the contemporary Court’s embrace of the 
negative view of the First Amendment as a restraint on governmental 
power rather than a celebration of speakers or speech, consider the 
Court’s decision in United States v. Alvarez.92 In earlier cases like New 
York Times v. Sullivan93 and Gertz v. Welch,94 the Court relied on 
positive theory to conclude that the First Amendment sometimes 
protects defamatory falsehoods about public officials and figures from 
the government’s regulation to prevent the chilling of valuable criticism 
and dissent. But in Alvarez, the Court struck down the government’s 
regulation of a speaker’s self-aggrandizing lie that he had received the 
Congressional Medal of Honor (a restriction that even the liar’s lawyer 
conceded neither punished nor chilled any valuable speech), relying 
solely on negative theory, that is, a focus on constraining the 
government rather than safeguarding valuable speech.95  
 
 91 But see KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 11 (“Instances of the federal courts 
contracting First Amendment rights constitute an important countertrend to the more 
generally observed, and often celebrated, ever-expanding First Amendment universe 
meme.”). 
 92 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 93 376 U.S. 254, 270-80 (1964) (explaining how criticism of public officials deserves 
constitutional protection because of its affirmative value in furthering democratic self-
governance). 
 94 418 U.S. 323, 339-44 (1974) (explaining the affirmative value of a free and 
“uninhibited press”). 
 95 See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion) (“Permitting the government to 
decree this speech to be a criminal offense, whether shouted from the rooftops or made 
in a barely audible whisper, would endorse government authority to compile a list of 
subjects about which false statements are punishable. That governmental power has no 
clear limiting principle. Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need 
Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”). Note that some lies may have affirmative First 
Amendment value. See Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, 
and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1437, 1437-38 (2015) (identifying certain 
lies by undercover journalists and investigators as valuably furthering democratic self-
governance); Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 165 
(“[L]ies that trigger confrontation and rebuttal may lead to increased public awareness 
and understanding of the truth, lies by undercover law enforcement or journalists can 
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Concerned with the potential for government’s institutional 
incompetence and malignant self-interest, negative theory rests on a 
distrust of the government’s efforts to assess expression’s costs and 
benefits.96 So here too, speech coverage and protection arch ever-
outward.97 
We note at least two tweaks for confronting the ever-expanding 
answer to the question of why the First Amendment protects speech — 
possibilities that explain not only when and why the First Amendment 
protects speech, but also when and why the First Amendment permits 
expression’s regulation to advance free speech and democratic values.  
The first is normative and suggests a hierarchy of free speech theories 
that privileges democratic self-governance as a tiebreaker when 
competing theories point in different directions.98 This hierarchical 
 
help expose the truth, and Socratic questioning in which a teacher knowingly asserts a 
falsehood can help a student to recognize and counter falsity.”). 
 96 See Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation 
and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1439, 1441 (1987) (“The 
framers were not intent on promoting some well-defined conception of the good, 
whether individual or societal. They were responding to problems that already had 
arisen [i.e., “specific perceived abuses of government power” like prior restraint] and 
that they feared might recur.”); Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological 
Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 445, 451 (2012) (describing a negative justification for the 
First Amendment as rooted “primarily on the grounds of distrust of government”). 
 97 Consider how these traditional justifications for free speech protection might 
apply to the growing expressive power of artificial intelligence (“AI”). AI is not human 
yet may profoundly affect human speakers and listeners, and does so in ways directly 
relevant — and often valuable — to marketplaces of ideas and information. As we note 
in earlier work, current theory and doctrine offer few obstacles to the First Amendment 
coverage of AI-enhanced speakers or the emerging technologies that shape and carry 
them. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 89, at 1175; Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton 
& Margot E. Kaminski, SIRI-OUSLY 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the 
First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481, 2482 (2017). 
 98 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, at xviii, 
xx (1993) (“[T]here is a large difference between a ‘marketplace of ideas’ — a 
deregulated economic market — and a system of democratic deliberation. . . . I argue 
that many of our free speech disputes should be resolved with reference to the 
Madisonian claim that the First Amendment is associated above all with democratic 
self-government.”); SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC, supra note 21, at 202-06 (relying on 
democratic self-governance theory to critique aspects of social media that interfere with 
voters’ exposure to a range of ideas); id. at 258 (“Free speech is never an absolute. . . . 
The question is how we can regulate some kinds of speech while promoting the values 
associated with a system of free expression, emphatically including democratic self-
government.”); Martin H. Redish & Julio Pereyra, Resolving the First Amendment’s Civil 
War: Political Fraud and the Democratic Goals of Free Expression, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 451, 
454 (2020) (recognizing that “false political speech may just as easily undermine the 
democratic process as facilitate it” and proposing an understanding of the First 
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theorizing means, more specifically, permitting the government to 
regulate speech that frustrates democratic self-governance at the 
occasional expense of the autonomy of speakers determined to interfere 
with democratic self-governance.  
The second relies on history and experience to set limits on negative 
theory by identifying where the government’s competence is high and 
its self-interest is low, such that greater deference to government is less 
threatening to basic free speech values. As Amy Kapczynski explains,  
A more democratic First Amendment, and one still recognizable 
in current doctrine, would also admit that history and 
experience can help us distinguish between settings in which 
governments are likely to abuse their powers and settings in 
which governments are likely to be necessary to give effect to 
collective judgments about how we wish to live and order our 
values.99 
These tweaks do not require foundational shifts in theory. Rather, they 
require in situ doctrinal adjustments that emphasize and privilege the 
First Amendment’s democracy-enhancing justifications. They also 
focus attention on the ways in which speech sometimes undermines 
core political speech itself.  
Indeed, these tweaks leverage precedents in which the Court has 
upheld (even under heightened scrutiny) carefully crafted laws that 
regulate speech to protect democratic self-governance in demonstrable 
ways.100 Recall, for example, the Court’s decision in Burson v. Freeman, 
where it upheld the government’s restriction of campaign literature 
within 100 feet of polling places to protect voters from coercion and 
 
Amendment that permits, in moderating conflicts between competing First Amendment 
interests, the government’s regulation of certain instances of “political fraud”).  
 99 Amy Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First Amendment and the FDA: Toward a More 
Democratic Political Economy, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 179, 203 (2018). Joseph 
Blocher has also recently proposed a potentially promising tweak, or perhaps a topple, 
to our understanding of First Amendment enlightenment (i.e., marketplace of ideas) 
theory, emphasizing the value of speech as the means to the end of knowledge rather 
than truth. Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, 133 HARV. L. REV. 440, 
468, 470 (2019) (“What matters is the maximization of knowledge, which includes not 
only the volume of truths but also the quantity and quality of justifications — bases for 
believing those truths. . . . My point here is only the general one that knowledge, rather 
than truth, might better capture the epistemic values that most people really want from 
free speech: not only quantity, but also quality, of information.”). 
 100 See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 443-44 (2015) (upholding 
rules of judicial conduct prohibiting solicitation of campaign funds by judicial 
candidates). 
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interference.101 And its decisions in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Comm’n and Doe v. Reed, where it upheld requirements that campaign 
speakers and petition signatories disclose their identities after 
concluding that the value of such disclosures to voters and to electoral 
integrity justified the interference with those speakers’ autonomy 
interest in remaining anonymous.102 
Taken together, these democracy-driven tweaks would understand 
the First Amendment to permit the government’s regulation of lies 
about the mechanics of voting — like lies about who is eligible to vote, 
where, and when.103 For the same reasons, these tweaks support an 
understanding of the First Amendment to permit the government to 
restrict foreign speakers’ ability to influence the outcome of U.S. 
elections by, for instance, prohibiting foreign entities’ campaign 
contributions and expenditures.104 They also support an understanding 
of the First Amendment to permit governmental efforts to combat 
extreme partisan gerrymandering that grossly distorts democratic 
processes, such as state voter-approved initiatives to prevent party 
insiders from serving on state redistricting commissions.105 Each of 
 
 101 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). But cf. Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 
138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018) (striking down, on First Amendment grounds, a law prohibiting 
the wearing of buttons or apparel with political insignia inside polling places).  
 102 Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 191 (2010) (rejecting a facial challenge to state law 
that required disclosure of petition signatures to assure integrity of petition process); 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (upholding campaign disclosure 
requirements and noting that “transparency enables the electorate to make informed 
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages”); see also Doe, 561 
U.S. 186 at 198 (explaining that the state’s interests in election integrity includes not 
only the prevention of fraud but “also extends more generally to promoting 
transparency and accountability in the electoral process”); ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS 
DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 92 (2014) [hereinafter 
CITIZENS DIVIDED] (“We impose disclosure requirements that apply to campaign-related 
expenditures but not to expenditures for public discourse generally.”). 
 103 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1889 n.4 (2018) (“We do not doubt that the 
State may prohibit messages intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and 
procedures.”).  
 104 See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285-86 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d mem., 132 
S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (in which the Court summarily affirmed, without an opinion, a lower 
court’s decision upholding the federal statutory ban on campaign contributions and 
independent expenditures by foreign nationals); see also Toni M. Massaro, Foreign 
Nationals, Electoral Spending, and the First Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 
664 (2011) (identifying the tension between the speaker-protective rhetoric and logic 
of Citizens United, and speaker-based restrictions on foreign nationals’ electoral 
spending). 
 105 See, e.g., Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2020) (rejecting a request 
for a preliminary injunction to Michigan’s voter-approved initiative that created a 
nonpartisan redistricting commission on which party leaders could not serve). 
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these laws involves the regulation of expression to enhance democratic 
self-governance. And each calls upon the government to make 
objectively verifiable determinations (for example, about the times and 
locations of polling places, about who is or is not a foreign national, and 
about who has or has not held a party leadership role) that invite less 
concern about the government’s competence or self-interest. 
B. Confronting the Court’s Focus on Speakers to the Detriment of 
Listeners 
Whom does the First Amendment protect? Speakers, for sure. But 
listeners matter too, as speech also serves their democratic self-
governance, autonomy, and enlightenment interests.106  
Difficult First Amendment problems include clashes between the 
First Amendment interests of speakers and listeners. This is the case, 
for example, when speakers seek to keep secrets when listeners want 
disclosure; when speakers want to shade the truth when listeners do not 
want to be duped; and when speakers wish to talk when listeners do not 
want to be spoken to. How should First Amendment law handle these 
conflicts?107 
Contemporary courts increasingly favor speakers over listeners when 
speakers’ preferences collide with listeners’ First Amendment interests 
in settings both inside and outside of public discourse — in other 
words, both inside and outside the space that Jack Balkin describes as 
“the space in which people express opinions and exchange views that 
judge what is going on in society.”108  
 
 106 See NEUBORNE, supra note 1, at 104-05 (discussing the undervalued role of the 
listener in speech analysis); Derek E. Bambauer, The MacGuffin and the Net: Taking 
Internet Listeners Seriously, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 475, 475-76 (2019) (describing how the 
Internet may inspire closer attention to the role of listeners in free speech thinking and 
doctrine — insofar as it reveals much about who they are and what and whom they are 
listening to — and may produce disruptive effects in tort law and other areas); James 
Grimmelmann, Listeners’ Choices, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 365, 370 (2019) (“Speech is a 
matching problem. Speakers speak; listeners listen. In each case, the question is to 
whom?” (emphasis omitted)); Leslie Kendrick, Are Speech Rights for Speakers?, 103 VA. 
L. REV. 1767, 1774 (2017) (concluding free speech protects both speakers and 
listeners); Norton, Powerful Speakers, supra note 58, at 441-42 (explaining that 
expression’s First Amendment protection sometimes turns on whether it furthers or 
frustrates listeners’ First Amendment interests). 
 107 See OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3 (1996) (noting that libertarian 
theories “[are] unable to explain why the interests of speakers should take priority over 
the interests of those individuals who are discussed in the speech, or who must listen 
to the speech, when those two sets of interests conflict”). 
 108 Jack M. Balkin, Keynote Address of the Association for Computing Machinery 
Symposium on Computer Science and Law: How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social 
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For instance, a divided Court interpreted the First Amendment to 
forbid Arizona’s campaign finance law that released additional public 
financing to publicly-funded candidates when their privately-financed 
opponents raised or spent more than the state’s initial grant to the 
publicly-financed candidates.109 In so holding, the majority framed the 
contested speech subsidy as an impermissible burden on privately-
financed speakers rather than the release of counterspeech for the 
benefit of voters as listeners.110 (Dissenting Justice Kagan described as 
“chutzpah” the assertion that Arizona violated the privately-financed 
candidates’ First Amendment rights by “disbursing funds to other 
speakers even though they could have received (but chose to spurn) the 
same financial assistance.”111) For this and related reasons, Greg 
Magarian describes the contemporary Court’s decisions on public 
campaign financing as focused “far less on the imperatives of democracy 
than on wealthy speakers’ autonomy” by “mandat[ing] a less-informed 
electorate whenever fuller information, funded by government, would 
reduce the persuasive force of a privately financed candidate.”112  
For another illustration of the contemporary Court’s choice to 
privilege speakers’ rights over listeners’, consider National Institute of 
Family and Life v. Becerra.113 There a 5-4 Court preliminarily enjoined 
California’s law that required unlicensed pregnancy service centers to 
inform women seeking reproductive health care services that the 
centers are in fact unlicensed (because they do not employ health-care 
professionals), and that required licensed facilities to inform women 
seeking reproductive health care services that the state offers free or 
low-cost comprehensive pregnancy-related services, including prenatal 
care, contraception, and abortion.114 In so holding, the majority 
 
Media (Oct. 28, 2019) (transcript available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3484114 [https://perma.cc/5N9V-FEA6]). First Amendment 
theory and doctrine generally presume speakers and listeners in public discourse to 
interact in conditions of equality, even if that presumption is more aspirational than 
real. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 23 (2012) (“Whereas within public 
discourse the political imperatives of democracy require that persons be regarded as 
equal and as autonomous, outside public discourse the law commonly regards persons 
as dependent, vulnerable, and hence unequal.”). 
 109 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 727-28 
(2011). 
 110 See id. at 742-43. 
 111 Id. at 766 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 112 MAGARIAN, supra note 3, at 200 (emphasis omitted). 
 113 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 114 Id. at 2371, 2378. 
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privileged the speakers’ autonomy interests in not disclosing this 
information against their will over listeners’ (that is, pregnant women’s) 
autonomy and enlightenment interests in receiving accurate 
information material to their reproductive decisions.115  
But here, too, other doctrinal strands privilege listeners’ interests in 
certain circumstances, thus creating opportunities for productive 
tweaks. First Amendment law has long favored comparatively 
vulnerable listeners over comparatively knowledgeable or powerful 
speakers in certain contexts outside of public discourse, like 
commercial speech.116 And the Court has recognized that listeners’ 
democratic self-governance, enlightenment, and autonomy interests 
sometimes justify interference with speakers’ unbridled autonomy even 
within public discourse when doing so furthers democratic legitimacy: 
recall the case of campaign disclosures, where the Supreme Court has 
recognized that listeners’ (i.e., voters’) interest in knowing the source of 
campaign contributions and communications sometimes justifies 
requiring campaign speakers to identify themselves even if they would 
prefer not to.117 The Court likewise placed listeners’ interests over 
speakers’ to protect democratic self-governance in public discourse 
when it upheld a ban on distributing campaign literature within 100 
feet of polling places to protect voters from coercion.118 And classic 
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech are often driven by 
concerns about speech harms to vulnerable listeners.119  
 
 115 For a discussion of what the First Amendment law that applies to speech to 
pregnant women seeking reproductive health services would look like if courts took 
women’s interests as listeners seriously, see Helen Norton, Pregnancy and the First 
Amendment, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2417, 2417-18 (2019) [hereinafter Pregnancy and the 
First Amendment]. 
 116 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
562-66 (1980) (protecting, as part of a well-developed line of cases doing so, 
commercial speech that furthers listeners’ First Amendment interests, while permitting 
the government to regulate false or misleading commercial speech because it frustrates 
listeners’ interests); Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 55, at 55-60 
(discussing how law sometimes privileges listeners in commercial and professional 
relationships). 
 117 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010); see also Red Lion Broad. Corp. 
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the 
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”); POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED, supra note 
102, at 8, 41 (asserting that the First Amendment seeks “to protect the processes of 
democratic legitimation” that fuel confidence that the people’s representatives are freely 
chosen by, and speak for, the people).  
 118 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). 
 119 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 646 (1994) (describing 
federal “must-carry” rules imposed on cable operators as seeking “not to favor 
programming of a particular subject matter, viewpoint, or format, but rather to preserve 
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Greater attention to listeners’ interests thus explains not only when 
and why the First Amendment protects speech but also when and why 
the First Amendment permits expression’s regulation in certain 
circumstances: specifically, we should privilege listeners’ interests over 
speakers’ when doing so furthers democratic self-governance.120 As one 
of us has suggested: 
As a doctrinal matter, [a listener-centered] focus might 
helpfully inform our choice of the appropriate level of scrutiny 
to be applied to such disclosures – for example, we might be 
less suspicious of disclosure requirements designed to protect 
listener autonomy than those motivated by other governmental 
purposes. Such a focus might also (or instead) help determine 
whether a contested disclosure requirement survives a specific 
level of review, depending on the justifications offered by both 
challenger and government. . . . [D]isclosure and disclaimer 
requirements should be understood as least troubling for First 
Amendment purposes when applied to speakers who seek to 
keep secrets or tell lies to manipulate their listeners’ decision-
making [and thus threaten their autonomy].121 
Listener-centered tweaks may empower the government to respond 
to the growing threats to listeners’ democratic self-governance interests 
posed by new technologies. As Nathaniel Persily explains, “[T]here 
simply is no support for the strong version of the marketplace of ideas 
when it comes to anonymous speech in the internet age. . . . The norms 
 
access to free television programming for the 40 percent of Americans without cable”); 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 81 (1949) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to an 
ordinance banning the use of sound trucks to protect listeners’ quiet and privacy).  
 120 See Norton, Powerful Speakers, supra note 58, at 473; Norton, Truth and Lies in 
the Workplace, supra note 55, at 55-60; see also Tebbe, supra note 59, at 978 (“The 
implication is not only that regulations protecting fair value ought to be upheld, but 
also that regulations impairing fair value ought to be suspect.”); id. at 1009 (relatedly 
criticizing the Court’s decision in Sorrell as focusing on whether “Vermont regulated 
categories of speaker and speech, [rather than on] whether the statute would promote 
the free flow of information to everyone, given the existing power dynamics among 
corporations, governments, and citizens”). 
 121 Helen Norton, Secrets, Lies, and Disclosure, 27 J.L. & POL. 641, 641-42 (2012); 
see also Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens 
United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 1005 (2011) (advocating that 
campaign disclosure requirements target large, powerful, and well-financed speakers 
whose size and resources suggest their capacity to manipulate others); Anthony J. 
Gaughan, Putin’s Revenge: The Foreign Threat to American Campaign Finance Law, 62 
HOW. L.J. 855, 857 (2019) (proposing federal legislation to require candidates and their 
campaigns to inform the Federal Election Commission of their communications with 
foreign governments). 
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of civility, the fears of retaliation and estrangement, as well as basic 
psychological dynamics of reciprocity that might deter some types of 
speech when the speaker and audience know each other – all are 
retarded . . . .”122 Relatedly, think of “deep fake” technologies that 
falsely — yet convincingly — represent expression as emanating from 
a source very different from the actual speaker.123 In response to these 
democratic and expressive threats, Richard Hasen urges “new law 
requiring social media to label as ‘altered’ synthetic media, including so-
called ‘deep fakes,’” and “campaign disclosure laws requiring those who 
use online and social media to influence voters, including those using 
bots and other new technology, to disclose their true identities and the 
sources and amounts of their spending.”124 Listener-focused tweaks 
understand the First Amendment to permit laws like these that 
recognize the importance of accurately identifying expression’s source 
when that source is valuable to listeners’ assessment of the message’s 
credibility and quality both inside and outside of public discourse. 
C. Confronting the Rigidity of the Neutrality Narrative 
How does the First Amendment protect free speech? Applying its 
neutrality narrative, the Court answers this question by claiming to 
 
 122 PERSILY, supra note 12, at 16; see also Helen Norton, Lies to Manipulate, 
Misappropriate, and Acquire Government Power, in LAW AND LIES: DECEPTION AND TRUTH-
TELLING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 143, 165-176 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015) (exploring 
how the First Amendment permits the regulation of lies about being the government, 
as well as certain other lies about the source of speech, because accurate information 
about expression’s source is so valuable to listeners).  
 123 See Bobby Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for 
Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1758 (2019) (citing 
Samantha Cole, We Are Truly Fucked: Everyone is Making AI-Generated Fake Porn Now, 
VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 24, 2018), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
bjye8a/reddit-fake-porn-app-daisy-ridley [https://perma.cc/48U9-FQH8]) (describing 
“deep fake” technologies, in which machine-learning algorithms “enable[] the creation 
of realistic impersonations out of digital whole cloth”). 
 124 Hasen, Deep Fakes, supra note 27, at 537, 553-54 (“[T]he deep fakes problem is 
surprisingly easier to solve (once the technology is in place) than the problem of low-
tech false information. When it comes to whether video or audio has been manipulated, 
there is an objective truth of the matter: a scientific comparison of original content with 
content posted online.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, 
Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. 988, 1009 (2019) (suggesting the value of 
disclosing the robotic source of speech in “certain circumstances, such as the 
commercial or electoral context”). 
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view any content- or speaker-based regulation of expression with 
suspicion.125  
Herein lies the knottiest puzzle.  
Left and right, poor and rich, outré and mainstream, sacred and 
profane — all theoretically enjoy equal speech rights. Under this view, 
my enemy’s free speech victory therefore is my free speech victory. 
Under this view, outliers stand to benefit the most from the neutrality 
narrative, because without it the crushing forces of majoritarianism 
would silence them first and most severely.126 Viewed in these lights, 
the neutrality narrative looks egalitarian at its core. Simple and 
purportedly win-win, the neutrality narrative is both promising and 
powerful.127 
To the extent that the neutrality narrative refuses to countenance 
unjustified differences in the government’s treatment of speech and 
speakers, it undeniably remains a powerful, even essential tool for 
protecting speech and equality alike, including those most likely to 
suffer from the day’s political orthodoxies.128 We share that sense of its 
importance. 
 
 125 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (“Content-based laws — 
those that target speech based on its communicative content — are presumptively 
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are 
narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”). 
 126 See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 376, 428 (suggesting that progressives may abandon 
liberalism’s libertarian thrust at their peril when free speech is at stake); Erica Goldberg, 
Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 736 (2016) (“The view that some 
speech should be suppressed so other speech can thrive threatens our free speech 
regime because it depends on difficult empirical and normative judgments about how 
suppression of speech impacts other speech and more broadly, how suppression of 
speech impacts the welfare of members of particularly vulnerable groups of society.”). 
 127 Note, however, that the Court is not always as neutral as it claims to be. See, e.g., 
Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech 
Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 47 (2011) (describing the different First Amendment 
rules that the Court applies to labor speech as opposed to employer speech); Norton, 
Pregnancy and the First Amendment, supra note 115, at 2417-18 (describing the different 
First Amendment rules that the Court applies to speech to pregnant women that 
discourages abortion as opposed to speech to pregnant women that identifies abortion 
as an available option).  
 128 Neutrality can take many forms. See Purdy, supra note 35, at 2176 (“This is not 
to say that neutrality is impossible or undesirable in doctrine or that decisions must be 
outcome oriented according to the Justices’ feelings about specific cases. If neutrality 
means avoiding this caricature of unprincipled decisionmaking, then neutrality is both 
desirable and achievable. But such neutrality has multiple possible forms. It might be 
consistent with neutrality to permit no private expenditure on political campaigns, 
relying on public financing and the strength of volunteer efforts and other shows of 
popular support. Alternatively, neutrality might require the doctrines of Buckley and 
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The neutrality narrative also points out an extremely important aspect 
of equality claims worth underscoring: free speech theory and doctrine 
have always included equality within the core of why free speech 
matters. Free speech and equality are inextricably connected, such that 
equality is endogenous to freedom of speech, not exogenous or 
antagonistic to it. That this creates occasional tensions and paradoxes 
within doctrine and theory does not prove otherwise. 
Seeing the value of the neutrality narrative for equality ends is 
relatively easy.129 Recall, for instance, religious actors’ adoption of civil 
rights rhetoric in recent legal and policy battles.130 Invoking the 
vocabulary of free speech and equality has enabled this movement to 
achieve victories upholding publicly funded vouchers for religious 
education,131 state funding to religious institutions of other sorts,132 
religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws,133 and access to 
public and limited forums134 — all despite the Establishment Clause 
 
Citizens United. It might be, too, that the best version of neutrality would start from a 
constitutional presumption that campaign-finance regulation is legitimate, subject to 
some constraint of reasonableness. . . . An egalitarian First Amendment jurisprudence 
should seek a version of neutrality that aims at supporting political equality against 
economic inequality.”).  
 129 See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 535 
(2004) (offering a compelling history of how American government has suppressed 
expression during wartime, and cautioning that “public officials not only respond to the 
demands of a fearful public [during wartime] but sometimes deliberately manipulate 
the public in order to create national hysteria,” with grave civil liberties costs (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 130 For an articulation of the history of religious civil liberties that argues for a more 
expansive right to free exercise, see Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990). 
 131 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653-54 (2002) (upholding Ohio school 
voucher plan against Establishment Clause objections). 
 132 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021-25 
(2017) (striking down, on Free Exercise Clause grounds, Missouri’s refusal to extend 
governmental funding for playground materials to a church playground); Mitchell v. 
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 842-43 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (plurality opinion) 
(allowing federal loans to religious schools for education-related equipment and 
materials); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-32 
(1995) (requiring public university to provide funding for religious student group 
publications on equal basis as that provided to nonreligious publications). 
 133 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 691-93 (2014) (holding that 
a closely held for-profit corporation could invoke statutory free exercise protections to 
avoid compliance with the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive coverage mandate). 
 134 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107-13 (2001) (striking 
down, on free speech grounds, public school’s exclusion of religious group from after-
school use of facilities); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384, 391-92 (1993) (same); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272-75 (1981) (striking 
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concerns that apply uniquely to the government’s interaction with 
religion. Insofar as these actors rely on expansive Free Speech Clause 
interpretations to advance their ends, their victories are also available 
to the LGBTQ community and other long-marginalized groups to 
advance their own ends. Indeed, no part of the free speech tradition may 
be more useful to these explicitly normative (and at times colliding) 
agendas than the neutrality narrative.135  
Harder to see, for some, is how the Court’s broad and unqualified 
claim to view all content- and speaker-based regulation with suspicion 
is both descriptively inaccurate and normatively misguided. Here again, 
we reject unnuanced or uncritical thinking, even as it relates to the 
neutrality mandate. 
The Court’s sometimes platitudinous claims to neutrality are 
descriptively inaccurate because they paper over the many settings in 
which it has upheld (and justifiably so) government’s speaker- and 
content-based distinctions.136 In other words, what the Court says it 
does is not always what it does: even as the Court asserts the 
compellingly simple narrative of bright-line formalism, its practice is 
not as simplistic or inflexible as it claims.137  
 
down, on free speech grounds, public university’s exclusion of religious student groups 
from limited public forums). 
 135 This dynamic played out, for example, in the context of after-school Christian 
groups that pursued their right to convene on public school property on an equal basis 
with other groups. Taking neutrality seriously means that what is good for the Christian 
goose must also be good for the gay gander — especially since secular speakers’ claims 
raise no Establishment Clause worries. But this too can have boomerang effects. See 
Toni M. Massaro, Religious Freedom and “Accommodationist Neutrality”: A Non-Neutral 
Critique, 84 OR. L. REV. 935, 989 (2006) (discussing how, in Utah, the neutrality 
principle led one school board to eliminate all extracurricular student clubs, rather than 
allow formation of a gay student support group).  
 136 See James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment 
Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1096-97 (2004) 
(“[P]recisely because public discourse in the United States is so strongly protected, the 
realm dedicated to such expression cannot be conceived as covering the entire expanse 
of human expression. . . . Thus, in settings dedicated to some purpose other than public 
discourse, such as those dedicated to effectuating government programs in the 
government workplace, instruction in a public school classroom, or the administration 
of justice in the courtroom, government has far greater leeway to regulate the content 
of speech.”). 
 137 See id. at 1099-1100 (“In summary, the popular view that all content-based 
restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional unless the speech falls within 
some unprotected category is not an accurate snapshot of First Amendment doctrine. 
Speech is too ubiquitous with too many real world consequences for there to be any 
such rule. Rather, the strong presumption against content discrimination operates only 
within a limited (albeit extremely important) domain.”); see also Genevieve Lakier, The 
Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2167 (2015) (contesting the 
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And for related reasons, the Court’s purported insistence on formal 
neutrality is normatively misguided in failing to acknowledge the ways 
in which factual distinctions sometimes should make a legal 
difference.138 Indeed, identifying such distinctions is the project of 
much legal analysis: “treating things and people the same is different 
from treating them equally” when there are important and relevant 
distinctions between them.139 This contributes to another paradox of 
the current doctrine: the more narrowly government tailors its 
regulation of expression by drawing distinctions targeted to the 
speakers or content that specifically threaten harm, the more likely it 
will trigger the Court’s suspicion.140  
 
Court’s purportedly history-driven account of the categorical exceptions to First 
Amendment protection); Genevieve Lakier, The Non-First Amendment Law of Freedom 
of Speech, 134 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3689972 [https://perma.cc/6J54-RDAT] [hereinafter Non-
First Amendment Law] (canvassing longstanding state and federal laws that distinguish 
on the basis of expression’s content or speaker identity to further free speech and 
democracy values and concluding that “what we find are legal protections for speech 
and association that are based on a different conception of freedom of speech than that 
given voice in the First Amendment cases — one that is much more concerned with the 
threat that private economic power poses to expressive freedom, and much less laissez 
faire in its understanding of the government’s responsibilities vis a vis the marketplace 
of ideas”); id. at 67 (“[T]he claim that the First Amendment forbids redistributive 
speech laws rests on an overly narrow — even somewhat mythological — view of the 
First Amendment, and of the American system of free expression as a whole. 
Redistributive speech laws are not alien to our regulatory traditions. Instead, they date 
back as far as the First Amendment itself, and even further (if we include the colonial 
voter intimidation laws).”). 
 138 See Goldberg, supra note 126, at 695 (canvassing precedent to “demonstrate[] 
how pervasive and inevitable free speech consequentialism [balancing] already is within 
First Amendment doctrine” and that “free speech consequentialism, more than being 
ubiquitous, is in fact inevitable”). 
 139 K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, in PREJUDICIAL 
APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 55, 56 (Robert C. Post, 
K. Anthony Appiah, Judith Butler, Thomas C. Grey & Reva B. Seigel eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES]; see also id. at 57 (“Equality as a social ideal is a 
matter of not taking irrelevant distinctions into account. . . . To understand equality 
this way is to see it as requiring that we treat like cases alike and thus to consider what 
makes two people or two kinds of people morally alike for current purposes.”). More 
generally, equality work compels observers to attend to particularisms, to the plural 
nature of identities, and to the many unequal starting points and fallouts. The 
pluralizing inquiry often leads to pluralizing responses, which makes for contextual 
distinctions that undermine the Court’s asserted preference for simple, context-neutral 
theory and doctrine. 
 140 For an example where the Court identified more narrowly tailored speech 
restrictions as a vice rather than a virtue, see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
383-88 (1992) (holding that the First Amendment permits government to forbid all 
fighting words, but not a subset of fighting words based on race or religion).  
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To be sure, First Amendment formalism has its advantages; in 
particular, it has affirmative value in constraining government 
decisionmakers.141 This may especially be the case when a clear and 
simplistic message preemptively warns policymakers away from 
misguided speech-suppressive efforts.142 Relatedly, context-specific 
speech rules and exceptions can be more difficult for lower courts to 
apply, and more expensive for government regulators to observe and 
enforce, than bright-line tests.143  
But the Court’s failure to acknowledge meaningful differences also 
has its costs.144 For example, if it were true that all content-specific 
 
 141 See Thomas C. Grey, Cover Blindness, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES, supra note 
139, at 85, 96 (“All parties, legalist and judicial, liberal and conservative, fear the 
consequences of too much judicial discretion. All might then converge on the 
substitution of rules that, although relatively crude, are also relatively objective and 
thus stable . . . .”). Formalistic approaches are also quicker and cheaper, as the more 
nuanced the doctrine or regulation, the more expensive to apply or enforce. But as 
Robert Post responds, “This tension between contextualism and formal consistency, 
however, is not entirely new to the law, and we are not without mechanisms for its 
ameliorization.” Robert C. Post, Response to Commentators, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES, 
supra note 139, at 153, 153. Tort law offers one of many examples, generally rejecting 
bright-line rules for the flexibility of the objective reasonable person standard.  
 142 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 109 
(14th ed. 2002) (“[E]ven though a justice must know deep down that no one can really 
mean there can be no restraints of free speech, there is value in his putting it that way 
nonetheless.”); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY AND CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT 
HAS READ THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 315, 375 (2019) (drawing from Meir Ben-
Cohen’s theory of acoustic separation to explain how courts sometimes assert one 
message to policymakers and the public, and another more nuanced message to lawyers 
and observing that “the Court speaks as if the standard is the same, affirming the 
public’s overwhelming view that the standard should be the same. But it practices a role 
that allows more accommodation than would [otherwise be tolerated]”).  
 143 They also invite litigation, which may trigger the capacity apprehensions 
regarding judicial resources so powerfully illuminated by Andrew Coan. See generally 
ANDREW COAN, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION: HOW JUDICIAL CAPACITY SHAPES SUPREME 
COURT DECISION-MAKING (2019) (arguing that vague standards “generate greater 
uncertainty, increasing the volume of litigation and the frequency of conflict among 
lower-court decisions”). 
 144 See Brown, supra note 72, at 973 (“[W]hen a regulation seeks to address harm 
that is not produced by the dissemination of an idea, but rather the government offers 
a persuasive non-censorial theory of how the speech causes harm, then the Court has 
tended to be sympathetic and has found a way to make an end run around the cardinal 
rule. The lack of acknowledgment of this important role of the harm principle in free-
speech jurisprudence, however, leaves the matter easily open to inappropriate 
considerations, in-group biases, and error.”); Lakier, Non-First Amendment Law, supra 
note 137 (manuscript at 5, 60) (describing the historical tradition of state and federal 
free speech law as considerably “less committed to the principles of content- and value-
neutrality” than acknowledged by the Court’s description of our free speech tradition 
and concluding that the Court’s inaccurate description “is a problem not only because 
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regulation triggers the same, very strict scrutiny, the Court might well 
retreat from covering large swaths of speech altogether.145 (Recall, for 
instance, Justice Hugo Black’s claim to First Amendment absolutism, an 
insistence that sometimes led him to define “speech” very narrowly to 
avoid hard First Amendment problems.146) 
Possibilities for tweaks here include widening the cracks in the 
Court’s formalist wood by exposing and underscoring the reality that 
the Court sometimes does adjust its doctrine in different settings, and 
often with good reason, as it generates different rules for commercial 
speech, professional speech, speech at work and at school, speech in 
courtrooms, and speech at polling places.147 This, in turn, invites more 
 
it produces incoherent doctrinal distinctions but because it permits the Court to 
proclaim a commitment to principles — in particular, the principle of free speech laissez 
faire — that in reality it cannot sustain”). 
 145 See Frederick Schauer, Every Possible Use of Language?, in THE FREE SPEECH 
CENTURY 33, 43 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2019) (expressing concern 
that expanding the coverage of the First Amendment would ultimately lead to less 
rigorous protection — in the form of watered-down strict scrutiny — of speech that is 
currently covered); id. at 47 (“[I]t may be no coincidence that those jurisdictions with 
an expansive understanding of the coverage of the right to freedom of speech (or 
expression, or communication) turn out also to have a significantly less stringent degree 
of protection for the speech that is covered, and even for the speech that lies at the 
center of the principle of free speech. It is perhaps unreasonable to make a strong causal 
claim, but at the very least the existence in the United States of a limited domain of 
coverage and a high degree of protection within that limited domain suggests that this 
correlation reflects a causal relationship. If that is correct, then it may be that the 
willingness explicitly to limit the coverage of the First Amendment is a source of the 
First Amendment’s greatest strength.”). 
 146 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(characterizing the message “Fuck the Draft” displayed on a jacket as “mainly conduct 
and little speech”); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (minimizing students’ free speech interests); see also 
Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 384 (2009) (“Justice Black trimmed the most problematic results 
of his absolutist test by finding categorical exceptions to the categorical rule. Indeed, he 
was quicker than many balancing-inclined Justices to find that certain speech acts fell 
completely outside the bounds of the First Amendment.”). 
 147 Justice Alito recently suggested this possibility for attending to relevant 
distinctions: “The Court should be more attentive to the implications of its rhetoric for, 
contrary to the Court’s suggestion, there are important differences between cyberspace 
and the physical world.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1743 (2017) 
(Alito, J., concurring). Relatedly, lower courts often recognize the cracks in the Court’s 
formal neutrality narrative. See William D. Araiza, Invasion of the Content-Neutrality 
Rule, 2019 BYU L. REV. 875, 912 (“[E]ven relatively recent lower court opinions have 
continued to resist imposing strict scrutiny on commercial speech regulations, despite 
Sorrell’s implication that they should.”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate 
Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
783, 816 (observing in other First Amendment contexts that “the lower courts are not 
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attention to when and how distinctions should make a difference, 
especially in light of information and power differentials among 
speakers and listeners.148 In other words, we do not propose to abandon 
the neutrality narrative, but instead to recognize its limitations and 
complications. 
To this end, compelling evidence of the democratic harms that speech 
sometimes inflicts can and should matter. Contemporary courts, 
though, too rarely test expression’s connection to promised benefits and 
threatened harms.149 Even when empirical data are available, the Court 
too often waves off their implications in favor of simple storytelling and 
formalist abstractions unsupported by evidence.150 As an illustration, 
consider the area of election law, where courts routinely accept states’ 
assertion that voter fraud justifies increasingly restrictive voting laws151 
 
following the Supreme Court’s marching orders”); David L. Hudson, Jr., The Content-
Discrimination Principle and the Impact of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 70 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 259, 281 (2019) (“Reed’s impact has been minimized, however, as courts have 
continued to follow two longstanding doctrines in First Amendment law: the 
commercial-speech and the secondary-effects doctrine.”); Kyle Langvardt, A Model of 
First Amendment Decision-Making at a Divided Court, 84 TENN. L. REV. 833, 851 (2017) 
(“Reed’s hard line is almost certainly too extreme to hold, and there is evidence even 
now that the lower courts are already at pains to minimize its practical effects.”). 
 148 See Cohen, Tailoring Election Regulation, supra note 21, at 662-63 (“[T]he free 
speech imperative should not be interpreted to shelter the deliberate construction and 
fine-tuning of an information environment optimized to unravel the most basic 
preconditions for democratic self-government. . . . Platform functions and dysfunctions 
therefore should supply the frame for assessing constitutionally-required goodness of 
fit, and legislation appropriately tailored to the platform-based environment and its 
particular democratic failure modes should be correspondingly more likely to survive 
review.”). 
 149 Many of these theoretical disputes may be better seen, at root, based on dueling 
and untested empirical assumptions. See Toni M. Massaro, Post, Fiss, and the Logic of 
Democracy, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1145, 1157 (1993) (maintaining that “as to many — 
perhaps most — of the factors relevant to the community/autonomy balance that is our 
free speech Tradition, we often lack empirical data. How, for example, does one ‘prove’ 
that people are not autonomous? That hate speech silences? Or that these silences are 
worse than the silences that might be inspired by a hate speech code?”). 
 150 See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 
746 (2011) (striking down Arizona’s matching funds provision within its public 
campaign finance law and asserting that “we do not need empirical evidence to 
determine that the law at issue is burdensome”).  
 151 See BEN MERRIMAN, CONSERVATIVE INNOVATORS: HOW STATES ARE CHALLENGING 
FEDERAL POWER 94 (2019); see also POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED, supra note 102, at 164 
(describing “the absence of any factual demonstration that confidence [in electoral 
integrity] was actually at risk despite severe and demonstrable curtailments of the right 
to vote”).  
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— even though there is very little evidence of such fraud.152 Meanwhile, 
“[o]wing in part to a deep aversion to statistical evidence, the judiciary 
has also been unreceptive to the most compelling evidence that new 
[voting restrictions] do indeed restrict voting.”153 
But the tide on this may yet turn. Empirically savvy legal scholars are 
beginning to address the evidence gap in some of these zones with 
growing sophistication.154 Better evidence of the costs and the benefits 
of competing doctrinal alternatives can advance our understanding 
about how speech actually works.155 And courts may be increasingly 
hard-pressed to ignore these assessments of how doctrine is — or is not 
— producing the outcomes it claims to promote. 
These sorts of tweaks — exposing that the Court’s actual practice is 
often more context-sensitive than it claims and offering solid evidence 
documenting the specific injuries inflicted by certain speech — can and 
should help justify government’s speaker- and content-based 
distinctions when those distinctions explain how the regulated 
expression harms free speech and democracy. These steps enable us to 
understand not only when and why the First Amendment protects 
certain speech, but also why it permits laws that require certain speakers 
to tell the truth about matters like the mechanics of elections or their 
identities as campaign speakers, campaign contributors, and even 
 
 152 See FAMIGHETTI ET AL., supra note 34, at 1 (finding that election officials referred 
only approximately thirty incidents of suspected noncitizen voting for further 
investigation or prosecution out of 23.5 million votes cast in the 2016 election, and that 
forty out of forty-two jurisdictions studied reported no known incidents of noncitizen 
voting). 
 153 MERRIMAN, supra note 151, at 25. For a promising counterexample, see Fish v. 
Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1144 (10th Cir. 2020) (striking down state law that required 
voters to provide documentary proof of citizenship after carefully attending to both the 
evidence of significant burden to voters and the lack of evidence of voter fraud). 
 154 See, e.g., Ho & Schauer, supra note 40, at 1163 (noting complexities of the 
empirical claims that may underpin the “marketplace of ideas” theory of free speech 
and setting forth possible means of testing some of them). 
 155 See RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Freedom of the Press in Post-
Truthism America, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 419, 437 (2020) [hereinafter Freedom of the 
Press] (excavating the social science evidence that demonstrates how press audiences 
— that is, individual information consumers — actually “seek out and process 
information,” and explaining how this evidence supports an understanding of the Press 
Clause to provide the press with constitutional protections distinct from those 
guaranteed by the Free Speech Clause); Kapczynski, supra note 99, at 203 (“Historical 
experience and empirical evidence can and should inform courts’ understandings of the 
markets and regulators in question. Where evidence shows — as in the examples of 
drug detailing and evidence production about medicines and tobacco — that markets 
exhibit patterned forms of power and disempowerment, First Amendment analysis can 
and should take this into account.”). 
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robots.156 So too of election laws that regulate speakers based on their 
foreign identity by barring foreign actors from influencing U.S. 
elections, as well as voter-approved initiatives that restrict party insiders 
from serving on state redistricting commissions to prevent partisan 
gerrymandering.157 Defending these laws requires that one articulate 
why such content- and speaker-based speech restrictions preserve 
healthy democracy. And judicial acceptance of this evidence, in turn, 
allows advocates to show when and why that reasoning applies in other 
contexts too.158  
D. Confronting How the Government’s Own Speech Can Threaten Free 
Speech 
How does the government threaten free speech? To date, First 
Amendment doctrine focuses on the government’s hard law regulation 
— that is, the traditional exercise of its coercive power to censor others’ 
speech. But as the government’s expressive capacities grow, so too does 
their potential for squelching others’ speech and distorting public 
discourse.159 
Government speech is inevitable; the government cannot further its 
inevitably viewpoint-sensitive policy agenda if precluded from speaking 
to advance these ends.160 And government speakers obviously can 
effectively deploy their expressive powers to resist other governmental 
entities’ policies with which they disagree.161 The government’s speech 
 
 156 See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
 157 See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
 158 See, e.g., Jones & Sun, Freedom of the Press, supra note 155, at 458-60 (proposing 
that Press Clause protections should turn on whether an individual or entity performs 
functions that enhance, rather than inhibit, the marketplace of ideas).  
 159 See HELEN NORTON, THE GOVERNMENT’S SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION 157 (2019) 
(“At times the government deploys its speech as a weapon to quash less powerful 
speakers, to smother expression with which it disagrees. This, in turn, can undermine 
the core values that inform the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.”). 
 160 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757-58 (2017) (“When a government entity 
embarks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects 
others. The Free Speech Clause does not require government to maintain viewpoint 
neutrality when its officers and employees speak about that venture. Here is a simple 
example. During the Second World War, the Federal Government produced and 
distributed millions of posters to promote the war effort. There were posters urging 
enlistment, the purchase of war bonds, and the conservation of scarce resources. These 
posters expressed a viewpoint, but the First Amendment did not demand that the 
Government balance the message of these posters by producing and distributing posters 
encouraging Americans to refrain from engaging in these activities.”). 
 161 See Toni M. Massaro & Shefali Milczarek-Desai, Constitutional Cities: Sanctuary 
Jurisdictions, Local Voice, and Individual Liberty, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 58-59 
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thus is constitutionally valuable even when it makes us crazy: even at 
its most infuriating, the government’s speech educates the public about 
the government’s principles and priorities, which provides us with more 
information with which to evaluate the government. The Court thus has 
appropriately recognized that the First Amendment does not bar the 
government from expressing its own views when doing the 
government’s business.162  
But the Court’s doctrine remains dangerously incomplete in its failure 
to “grapple with the ways in which the government’s speech sometimes 
affirmatively threatens specific constitutional values.”163 In particular, 
the government imperils democracy at its core when it abuses its 
expressive power in ways that escape political accountability. The 
government also distorts democratic self-governance and the 
marketplace of ideas when government officials propagate flat-out lies, 
monopolize information conduits, skew scientific discourse, bully 
political dissenters, or demonize the press.164 When we add to this mix 
 
(2018) (discussing how “sanctuary jurisdictions” have used speech to challenge federal 
immigration policy they perceive as undermining local power to assure community 
safety and civil rights). 
 162 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 207 (2015) 
(“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from 
determining the content of what it says. . . . Were the Free Speech Clause interpreted 
otherwise, government would not work.”). 
 163 Helen Norton, The Government’s Manufacture of Doubt, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
342, 349 (2018); see also Massaro, Tread on Me!, supra note 1, at 402 (cautioning that 
government speech may undermine free speech itself when it imposes “so much 
expressive power that its actions are tantamount to direct speech regulation”). 
 164 See Nathan Cortez, Information Mischief Under the Trump Administration, 94 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 315, 315-18 (2019); Jones & Sun, Enemy Construction, supra note 15, at 1303. 
During the coronavirus crisis, President Trump’s press conferences often contained 
misleading and inaccurate statements about the virus. Ryan Grenoble, 10 of Trump’s Most 
Damaging Coronavirus Lies, HUFFPOST (Mar. 27, 2020, 1:16 PM ET), https://www. 
huffpost.com/entry/trump-coronavirus-liescovid19_n_5e7b7d1ac5b6b7d80959966f 
[https://perma.cc/8LN5-9FX7] (listing false statements by Trump). Among the most 
alarming of these statements by President Trump — which he later described as 
“sarcastic” and taken out of context — involved his suggestion that disinfectant might 
treat the disease. Daniel Funke, In Context: What Donald Trump Said About Disinfectant, 
Sun and Coronavirus, POLITIFACT (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.politifact.com/article/ 
2020/apr/24/context-what-donald-trump-said-about-disinfectant-/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5ENU-WH5R]. This prompted manufacturers and health officials to immediately 
renounce the statement to prevent people from acting on Trump’s nationally televised 
suggestion. Katie Rogers, Christine Hauser, Alan Yuhas & Maggie Haberman, Trump’s 
Suggestion That Disinfectants Could Be Used to Treat Coronavirus Prompts Aggressive 
Pushback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/us/ 
politics/trump-inject-disinfectant-bleachcoronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/F6P7-68BA]. 
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the government’s many and varied expressive roles,165 we see the 
dangers of entirely excepting the government’s speech from Free Speech 
Clause scrutiny. The Supreme Court itself has begun to recognize this 
concern,166 and some lower courts are increasingly aware of the threats 
to free speech and democracy that may be posed by the government’s 
expressive choices.167  
As one of us has written, litigants should build on this recognition by 
demonstrating how the government’s threats sometimes silence its 
targets’ speech as effectively as its hard law action, and how its 
expressive attacks sometimes incite or encourage third parties to punish 
its targets for their speech.168 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that the government’s speech can violate the First Amendment through 
credible threats to unleash its coercive power against disfavored 
speakers.169 Lower courts also have observed that the government’s lies 
 
 165 NORTON, supra note 159, at 11 (“The government is unique among speakers 
because of its coercive power as sovereign, its considerable resources, its privileged 
access to key information, and its wide variety of speaking roles as policymaker, 
commander-in-chief, employer, educator, health care provider, property owner, and 
more.”). 
 166 See Walker, 576 U.S. at 208 (“That is not to say that a government’s ability to 
express itself is without restriction. Constitutional and statutory provisions outside of 
the Free Speech Clause may limit government speech. And the Free Speech Clause itself 
may constrain the government’s speech if, for example, the government seeks to compel 
private persons to convey the government’s speech.”). 
 167 See, e.g., Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d. 
226, 230 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that President Trump violated the First Amendment 
when he blocked some of his critics from the Twitter account that he uses to speak to 
the world as president); Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 672-73 (4th Cir. 2019) 
(holding that the chair of a county’s board of supervisors violated the First Amendment 
when she blocked a political critic from the county’s social media site). 
 168 See NORTON, supra note 159, at 160 (“When the government uses its lawmaking 
or other regulatory power to punish dissent – as is the case, for example, when it jails, 
taxes, or fines its critics – it violates the Free Speech Clause. And under some 
circumstances, the government can achieve the same results through its expressive 
choices, as is the case of its speech that threatens, or encourages retaliation against, 
certain speakers.”).  
 169 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71-72 (1963) (holding that a state 
commission violated the First Amendment when it sent threatening letters to 
distributors of sexually explicit but non-obscene books and magazines); cf. 
Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 234-35 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 46 (2016) (enjoining, on First Amendment grounds, a sheriff’s speech that sought 
to shut down sexually explicit advertisements through false threats of legal action); 
Okwedy v. Molinari, 333 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A public-official defendant 
who threatens to employ coercive state power to stifle protected speech violates a 
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, regardless of whether the threatened punishment 
comes in the form of the use (or, misuse) of the defendant’s direct regulatory or 
decisionmaking authority over the plaintiff, or in some less-direct form.”). 
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and misrepresentations about its critics can violate the First 
Amendment when they encourage and provoke nongovernmental third 
parties to fire or otherwise retaliate against its targets.170 Others have 
found that the government’s verbal “campaigns of harassment and 
humiliation” of its targets can violate the Free Speech Clause if 
“reasonably likely to deter” protected speech.171 And the Court has 
acknowledged the threats to free speech posed by a government’s 
punishment of disfavored speakers through its expressive choices that 
take the form of certain derogatory labels or designations.172  
Available tweaks thus may be drawn from these pockets of precedent 
to develop a coherent doctrine for addressing the ways in which the 
government’s speech itself can threaten meaningful public discourse.173  
 
 170 See Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) (refusing to dismiss a 
plaintiff’s constitutional claim alleging that the government had retaliated against her 
speech with false and threatening speech of its own to her employer that led to her 
firing); see also ACLU v. King, 84 F.3d 784, 785 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The Mississippi State 
Sovereignty Commission (‘Commission’) gathered personal information about 
Mississippi citizens from 1957 to 1977, with the purpose of thwarting desegregation 
and other civil rights work. The Commission records included information, some of 
which was not true, about individuals’ sexual preferences and activities, financial 
dealings, political and religious beliefs and affiliations, and drug and alcohol use. This 
information was disseminated by the Commission to law enforcement agencies, 
employers, and others prior to 1977.”); ACLU v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (“We echo the district court in stating that the thwarting of constitutional 
imperatives is not a legitimate and proper concern.”). 
 171 Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 975-77 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Addison 
v. City of Baker City, 758 F. App’x 582, 584 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that “the district 
court properly found that [the police chief] engaged in a campaign of harassment over 
a period of years” — a campaign directed to the plaintiff’s employer that ultimately led 
to the plaintiff’s job loss). 
 172 See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 139 (1951) 
(recognizing the effect of the Attorney General’s inclusion of an organization on its list 
of “subversive” organizations as “crippl[ing] the functioning and damag[ing] the 
reputation of those organizations”); id. at 142 (Black, J., concurring) (“In the present 
climate of public opinion it appears certain that the Attorney General’s much publicized 
findings, regardless of their truth or falsity, are the practical equivalents of confiscation 
and death sentences for any blacklisted organization not possessing extraordinary 
financial, political or religious prestige and influence.”); see also Seth F. Kreimer, 
Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in 
Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12, 28-29 (1991) (explaining the free speech 
harms of the government’s “informational sanctions”).  
 173 For a detailed discussion of these possibilities, see NORTON, supra note 159, at 
156-82.  
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E. Confronting State Action and Private Power 
Who and what threaten free speech and democracy? The government, 
of course, and, as we have just seen, in a variety of ways. But not just 
the government: the many examples include the bots unleashed by 
private parties that flood social media; private information conduits that 
sometimes act as monopsonic174 and monopolistic speech gatekeepers; 
and new technologies run by private actors that fortify information silos 
in ways that may isolate, beguile, and steer listeners in ways they may 
not even apprehend.175 This, too, current First Amendment doctrine 
fails to adequately address.  
As Charles Black observed, the state action doctrine may be the most 
important in all of constitutional law.176 The basic structure of modern 
constitutional liberties, including but not limited to freedom of 
expression, rests on the contested notion that private actors cannot 
violate them (with one key exception: the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition on slavery177). According to this account, liberties lie on 
only one side of the equation: we protect liberty only when we restrain 
the government and not when we empower it.178  
This libertarian narrative is the result of the Court’s more general 
inattention to the ways in which private power sometimes smothers 
liberty.179 But this has not always been the case. Earlier doctrine took 
into account how the government’s support for private parties’ 
discrimination in various settings enabled that discrimination as a 
functional matter, and thus required the government’s disassociation 
 
 174 A monopsony is a market with a single buyer that has the power to drive down 
prices.  
 175 See supra notes 12–37 and accompanying text. 
 176 See Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and 
California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 69 (1967).  
 177 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 178 See FISS, supra note 107, at 83 (“We must learn to embrace a truth that is full of 
irony and contradiction: that the state can be both an enemy and a friend of speech; that 
it can do terrible things to undermine democracy but some wonderful things to enhance 
it as well.”). 
 179 See Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1241, 1304, 1307 (2020) (observing that “private economic power could limit the 
exercise of constitutional rights just as government coercion could” and identifying the 
Court’s Lochner-era mistake as insisting “on construing constitutional rights as largely 
negative autonomy rights — as rights that entitled the individual to freedom from 
governmental regulation, but not rights that entitled the individual to anything more 
positive (such as a meaningful choice about where and how to contract)”).  
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from these ends.180 The contemporary Court, in contrast, is slow to 
grasp the government’s role in enabling private parties’ growing 
capacity to threaten free speech and democracy.181 Responsive tweaks 
would build on the pockets of precedent identified in the preceding 
subpart to urge courts to recognize when and how government enables 
the weaponization of speech by private actors.182  
Even so, courts are not the only game in town, and this reality creates 
additional opportunities for constructive democracy-driven 
interventions.183 Private actors may play a role in improving democratic 
discourse, even though they are not constitutionally required to do so. 
Some of the threats we identify thus can be attacked from other angles: 
if voters and consumers demand better information, they may compel 
its production. Reformers can take their democracy-enhancing 
proposals directly to the tech-complex settings where decisionmakers 
may be more technologically astute and representative than the courts. 
In other words, private actors’ freedom from constitutional constraint 
ideally empowers them to experiment.184 Private-sector actors may 
 
 180 See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 464-65 (1973) (striking down, on equal 
protection grounds, state’s financial support of textbooks for racially segregated private 
schools); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299-302 (1966) (holding that a city’s ongoing 
support and maintenance of a racially segregated park that had been donated to the city 
by a private party constituted state action for equal protection purposes); Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961) (holding that city’s housing of 
private, racially segregated, coffee shop in its building constituted entanglement 
sufficient to establish state action for equal protection purposes); Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1, 14-23 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of racially discriminatory 
property covenant constituted state action for equal protection purposes).  
 181 For a recent illustration, see Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 
1921, 1926 (2019) (holding that the private entity that administers public access 
channels of a New York cable system was not a state actor despite having been 
designated to perform that function by the City of New York, and thus rejecting the 
argument that the public access channels were a public forum from which the entity 
could not block access based on disagreement with its content). 
 182 See Wu, supra note 7, at 550 (suggesting that we explore “accomplice liability 
under the First Amendment” by asking “when the state or political leaders may be held 
constitutionally responsible for encouraging private parties to punish critics”); supra 
notes 163–72 and accompanying text. 
 183 See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 5, at 173 (“Democracy demands from its 
participants a certain political morality. In the absence of that political morality, nothing 
in the toolkit of constitutional designers will save constitutional democracy. Design, in 
short, can go only so far without decency.”). 
 184 See PERSILY, supra note 12, at 5-7 (identifying possibilities for reform of the digital 
speech environment as including deletion, demotion, disclosure, delay, dilution, 
diversion, deterrence, and digital literacy). 
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voluntarily embrace norms of free speech and democracy.185 Indeed, the 
new information technologies have enabled what Kate Klonick terms 
“new governors” — private actors with substantial power over 
platforms and information that sometimes choose to adopt procedures 
and policies that are informed by free speech values.186 Start-ups come 
in many forms, and some may develop means of attacking the 
disinformation distortions we lament with creative tech-savvy 
interventions that can leverage artificial intelligence power to distill 
expression and enable motivated listeners to cut a more direct path to 
reliable information, without slogging through the Sargasso Sea of 
unreliable feeds and falsehoods.  
To this end, the private sector’s relative freedom to think anew about 
free speech governance offers it opportunities to reimagine responses to 
the excesses of speech that threaten democratic values.187 Policy and 
design, for example, can privilege listeners’ interests to democratic 
ends.188 As Karen Kornbluh and Ellen Goodman urge: “Too often, the 
 
 185 Jack Goldsmith and Andrew Woods argue that during the coronavirus pandemic, 
American tech platforms moved toward significant speech control and digital 
surveillance, showing just how responsive private actors can be to arguments for such 
steps in situations where the government almost certainly could not require them. Jack 
Goldsmith & Andrew Keane Woods, Internet Speech Will Never Go Back to Normal, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/what-
covid-revealed-about-internet/610549/ [https://perma.cc/HD5A-CJYX]. 
 186 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing 
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603 (2018); see also Thomas E. Kadri & Kate 
Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan: Public Figures and Newsworthiness in Online Speech, 93 
S. CAL. L. REV. 37, 37 (discussing how public and private governance systems handle 
doctrinal questions in identifying public figures and newsworthiness and suggesting 
how courts and platforms might use these examples to address some challenges posed 
by online speech). 
 187 See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662-64 
(1998) (observing that in addition to law, other alternatives for regulating harmful 
human behavior include code, markets, and norms). Along these lines, some writers 
concerned with the dangers of speech in cyberspace argue the solution should aim at 
systemic design flaws rather than content regulation. 
 188 KAREN KORNBLUH & ELLEN P. GOODMAN, FIVE STEPS TO COMBAT THE INFODEMIC 5 
(2020); see also KAREN KORNBLUH & ELLEN P. GOODMAN, SAFEGUARDING DIGITAL 
DEMOCRACY: DIGITAL INNOVATION AND DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE ROADMAP 3 (2020) 
[hereinafter SAFEGUARDING DIGITAL DEMOCRACY], https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/ 
files/Safeguarding%20Democracy%20against%20Disinformation_v7.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/6VA4-65ZX] (discussing digital-era threats to democracy posed by foreign and 
domestic disinformation campaigns that “reduc[e] trust and corrupt[] the information 
ecosystem needed for democratic debate”); id. at 5 (“The new digital media policy 
roadmap we layout would steer clear of vague rules that empower governments to define 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ content and would instead focus on updating offline protections, fostering 
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only alternative proposed to today’s laissez-faire approach would 
increase government control over content. This false choice — between 
allowing platforms or government to act as censor — has hobbled the 
policy debate. A new approach should empower users.”189 
Whether and when private actors will act with a First Amendment 
conscience to design a better free speech mousetrap, however, remains 
to be seen. Sometimes they do.190 But many observers remain 
understandably pessimistic about platforms’ First Amendment 
inclinations, especially in light of their profit motives.191 For this reason, 
as Jack Goldsmith and Andrew Woods note, “governments must play a 
large role in these [private platform] practices to ensure that the internet 
is compatible with a society’s norms and values.”192  
To illustrate, private actors can design and deploy “user interface 
defaults that favor transparency (through better labeling)” to enable 
users easily “to distinguish transparent and ethical journalistic practices 
from trolling content and to tell if video has been altered.”193 And 
governments can enact legislation like the Honest Ads Act to “impose 
broadcast disclosure rules on platform ads,” require platforms to “verify 
who is actually funding ads rather than listing front groups,” and 
prohibit platforms from micro-targeting political ads.194 The tweaks 
 
user choice, amplifying the signal of independent news, supporting civic information, 
and holding platforms accountable for share, unambiguous, and transparent rules.”). 
 189 KORNBLUH & GOODMAN, SAFEGUARDING DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 188, at 5. 
 190 Id. at 27 (noting the news media’s voluntary adoption of professional and ethical 
standards that “not only included sourcing and editorial practices but also the provision 
of easy to understand information by clearly separating news from opinion, providing 
bylines and datelines at the top of stories, a masthead, and codes and standards”); Dawn 
C. Nunziato, Misinformation Mayhem: Social Media Platforms’ Efforts to Combat Medical 
and Political Misinformation, 19 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript 
at 68) (reviewing social media companies’ responses to false and misleading speech 
about COVID-19 and political matters and concluding “[s]ocial media companies have 
been generally inspired by First Amendment free speech values – both substantive and 
procedural – to protect a vibrant marketplace of ideas online while imposing limited, 
moderately effective checks on harmful false and misleading speech”). 
 191 See, e.g., Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information 
Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 501-02 (2019) (calling attention to the potential 
costs of the “information-fiduciary” framework); Olivier Sylvain, Recovering Tech’s 
Humanity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 252, 282 (2019) (asserting that reform “should address 
social media companies as commercial enterprises whose priority is to maximize user 
attention and engagement for advertisers”).  
 192 Goldsmith & Woods, supra note 185. 
 193 KORNBLUH & GOODMAN, SAFEGUARDING DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 188, at 5.  
 194 Id.  
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identified above explain why the First Amendment can and should be 
understood to permit these measures.195 
In short, private power — like government power — can be both an 
enemy of, and a friend to, free speech and democracy. Government and 
powerful private actors alike can, and do, weaponize speech as a tool 
for controlling others’ speech and frustrating meaningful public 
discourse and democratic outcomes. Conversely, both government and 
private parties can, and do, choose to incorporate the democracy-
promoting tweaks identified above when moderating content.  
CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, the pace of change in the speech environment—as 
in all areas that involve information technology — has become more 
exponential than incremental. This produces a peril and a paradox.  
The peril is that bold strategies may soon be required if law is to deal 
adequately with the democracy-damaging consequences of the twenty-
first-century speech environment. The paradox is that these rapid 
transformations also counsel judicial and scholarly modesty because 
their full consequences are ill understood.  
Tweak or topple, we must think creatively and critically. Here we 
have focused on tweaks out of respect for the many unknowns and the 
many practical barriers to reform, but especially out of respect for the 
vital importance of freedom of expression in a healthy democracy. At 
the same time, we recognize that the worsening pathologies of our 
contemporary speech environment understandably inspire some (if not 
many) to call for topples. Either way, we should be unwilling to hew to 
free speech bromides and practices where they no longer serve us or 
actively mislead us. We need to respond to the disconnect (that grows 
 
 195 Jack Balkin makes a related claim for the reform of free speech law: 
Neither judge-made doctrines of First Amendment law nor private companies 
will prove reliable stewards of the values of free expression in the twenty-first 
century. This means that we must rethink the First Amendment’s role in the 
digital era. On the one hand, the First Amendment retains its central purpose 
of guarding against state censorship through new devices of control and 
surveillance. On the other hand, courts should not interpret the First 
Amendment to prevent the state from regulating infrastructure companies in 
order to protect the values of a democratic culture and the ability of 
individuals to participate in the public sphere. Thus, the state, while always 
remaining a threat to free expression, also needs to serve as a necessary 
counterweight to developing technologies of private control and surveillance. 
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and 
New School Speech Regulation, 51 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1152 (2018). 
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larger each day) between existing First Amendment theory and doctrine 
and the new speech realities.  
To this end, we have identified some key features of contemporary 
First Amendment theory and doctrine that invite scholarly and 
litigation interventions to address the threats posed by the twenty-first-
century speech environment to free speech and democracy. We have 
also introduced a process for considering and addressing foundational 
obstacles for constructive First Amendment reform. And we have 
flagged productive tweaks to those core features.  
Our suggestions are geared to explaining not only when and why the 
First Amendment protects speech that furthers speech and democracy 
values, but also when and why it permits the carefully designed 
regulation of speech that frustrates those values. In short, we have 
proposed a structure for thinking about when speech is a means to 
democracy and when it is occasionally instead an obstacle to that first 
principle. We hope that scholars, lawyers, and policymakers will find 
this structure helpful in assessing when and why the First Amendment 
permits carefully calibrated interventions designed to promote free 
speech and democracy values. 
 
